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Water, a necessary piece of life, has become a scarcity in many regions, 
specifically within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Numerous national 
pursuits to quell depletion have formed and worked to acquire aid from the international 
community and aid agencies. Only recently have these efforts been maintained and 
formed to encapsulate aspects of a neoliberal development. These projects, designed to 
address water access and ecological concerns, are pushed toward commodification and 
control through international interests. One such project moving forward today is the 
Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance (RSDSWC) system. 
My thesis analyzes four reports on the RSDSWC system in Jordan. I dissect 
discourse and actors involved in each report, utilizing a 3-dimensional power analysis 
and compliance producing mechanisms to evaluate effects on political economy and the 
environment, and the potential for fostering peace and stability politically within the 
MENA region. I highlight discrepancies within and between the reports, both 
rhetorically and in the presence and absence of information. I conclude that as a 
neoliberal development project, the RSDSWC augments tensions surrounding water 
politics, perpetuates regional hegemony, and supports commodification strategies rather 
than peace.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Water, a carrier of life, has become a scarcity within the MENA region. In 
Jordan alone, water scarcity has hit an all time high, reducing what was once a 
necessary resource to that of a sought after commodity.1 With climate change and 
potable water usage on the rise, it is no question why regional and international 
communities are considering all opportunities to mitigate the effects of water scarcity. 
Yet, many proposed solutions, including transboundary pipelines and transportation of 
potable water by tanker across nations, soon conclude due to lack of funding or 
collaboration. Today, one such project, the RSDSWC system is still being considered. 
After multiple decades, beneficiary parties and multilateral aid agencies are working to 
make this project a reality for the region, augmenting not only a resource to help quell 
environmental concerns, but also a vital resource to the region.  
Overview of RSDSWC 
The RSDSWC, conceived at the end of the 20th century, is a plan working to 
increase water supply into the receding Dead Sea and produce more potable water to 
proximately situated countries.2 The three stated goals of the RSDSWC include, “1) To 
save the Dead Sea from Environmental Degradation; 2) To desalinate water and 
generate hydro-electric energy at affordable prices for Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian 
                                                        
1 Imad El-Anis, and Roy Smith, “Freshwater Security, Conflict, and Cooperation: The Case of the Red 
Sea – Dead Sea Conduit Project,” Journal of Developing Societies 29, no. 2 (2013): 5. 
2 Alexander McPhail and Stephen Lintner, 2013. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program: 
Overview, World Bank. Accessed October 3, 2017. 1. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/Overview_RDS_Jan_2013.pdf?r
esourceurlname=Overview_RDS_Jan_2013.pdf%26.  
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Authority; and 3) To build a symbol of peace and cooperation in the Middle East”.3 
RSDSWC proposes a 180-kilometer alignments stretching from the Red Sea to the 
Dead Sea, flowing up to 2000 million m^3 of water a year along the Jordanian/Israeli 
border.4 Starting at a location in the East side of the bay of Aqaba in Jordan, the water 
system will then flow water up, on Jordanian territory, to a hydraulic power system, and 
after, a desalination plant outside of Amman and near Dead Sea.5 RSDSWC is projected 
to desalinate 45% of the water flowing through, the potable water then being dispersed 
within Jordan (on the southern edge of Amman), Israel, and Palestine.6 In addition to 
potable water, the hydroelectric plants of the RSDSWC plan will produce an average 
10.6% growth in electrical power to the region.7 An image of the project can be seen 
below: 
                                                        
3 Coyne et Bellier, Tractebel Engineering, and KEMA, April 2011, Red Sea – Dead Sea Water 
Conveyance Study Program Feasibility Study: Draft Final Feasibility Study Report Main Report, Coyne 
et Bellier. Accessed October 3, 2017, Section 1-Page 2. 
4 Alexander McPhail, 2013. Red Sea-Dead Sea. World Bank. 2. 
5 Coyne et, Bellier, Tractebel Engineering, and KEMA, 2012. Red Sea – Dead Sea Water Conveyance 
Study Program Feasibility Project: Draft Final Feasibility Study Report Summary, Coyne et Bellier, 
Accessed October 3, 2017. 27-29. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/Feasibility_Study_Report_Summ
ary_EN.pdf.  
6 Up to 560 million m^3 of potable water per year will be given to Jordan (at the peak of production), 
along with 60 million m^3 of potable water a year given each to the Palestinian Authority and Israel.   
Coyne et Bellier, 2012, Red Sea-Dead Sea Feasibility Study Summary. 19, 21-22, 48-49. 
7 Ibid., 50. 
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Figure 1: “General Layout of Recommended Project”. 
This figure details the recommended route for the RSDSWC, including all components 
recommended by the Feasibility Study. This map is found in the Red Sea – Dead Sea 
Water Conveyance Study Program Feasibility Project: Draft Final Feasibility Study 
Report Summary. 
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Spurred from the concern of the lowering sea level of the Dead Sea, dropping 
from 394 meters below sea level in 1960 to 420 meters below sea level in 2007, and 
dropping at a rate of 0.8-1 meter/year, this project began to address climate related 
changes to the water levels of the Dead Sea.8 Throughout the decline of the Dead Sea’s 
level, due to factors of climate and diversion of the Jordanian River, both Jordan and 
Israel were concerned for the overall sustainability of the water, ecosystem, and local 
businesses within the area.9 Additionally, with Jordan being in the top four water 
poorest countries – the threshold for being water poor being 1000 m^3/year and a 
Jordanian getting an average of 150 m^3/year of water – this project also brought forth 
the possibility of Jordan being able to acquire a basic need of potable water.10  
History of the Project 
The first idea of connecting the Dead Sea to some larger body of water took 
place 150 years ago, nations in the Levant of the MENA region wanting to connect the 
Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea.11 As Hussam Hussein notes in his analysis of 
discourse surrounding trans boundary projects in the Levant, many of these project 
originally proposed concluded quickly, due to both political and economic strife.12 
Projects implemented prior to and in the 19th century centered on colonialist powers 
                                                        
8 Alexander McPhail, and Stephen Lintner, 2010. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program: 
Overview, World Bank. Accessed October 3, 2017. 1. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/Background_Note_October_2010
.pdf  
9 Alexander McPhail, 2010. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance, World Bank. 1. 
10 Hani Abu Qdais, “Environmental impacts of the mega desalination project: the Red- Dead Sea 
conveyor,” Science Direct no. 220 (2008): 17. 
11Basel Asmar, “The Science of Politics of the Dead Sea: Red Sea Canal or Pipeline,” The Journal of 
Environment and Development 12, no.3 (September 2003): 332. 
12 Hussam Hussein, “Politics of the Dead Sea Canal: a historic review of the evolving discourses, 
interests, and plans,” Water International 42, no. 5 (2017): 530. 
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yearning to expand geographically in the MENA region, mainly the British Empire 
attempting to bridge two bodies of water and eventually promote the foundation of the 
state of Israel.13 Recently, one main project proposed before the RSDSWC was that of 
the Mediterranean Sea- Dead Sea Canal (MSDSC) proposed by Israel in the mid-20th 
century to enhance water to the Israel state and assert technological advancements.14 
Yet, this project soon concluded due to energy concerns and lack of political backing on 
the international level, the United Nations General Assembly having to step in and 
demand the termination of the project.15 While understanding each of these projects 
leading up to the proposed RSDSWC is important, for the purpose of this analysis of 
power relations within the RSDSWC, these examples will only be used as context to 
stakeholders and proposed project components, rather than for comparative analysis.  
After the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, the idea of building the RSDSWC 
became feasible, establishing the coordination of the Peace Canal between Israel and 
Jordan in 1994.16 Muthur Haddadin, the then Jordanian negotiator in multilateral peace 
negotiations, reintroduced the idea of taking action to prevent the decrease in Dead Sea 
levels and increase the region’s freshwater supply.17 Israeli and Jordanian forces then 
worked to include the World Bank in 2002 to accelerate the creation of the project.18 
                                                        
13 Hussam Hussein, “Politics of the Dead Sea,” 528-530. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Concerns surrounding the project included chauvinistic pursuits of Israel to make this an Israel focused 
water canal. This posed concerns in the international community regarding the project, mainly in the 
areas of international law, economic damage to surrounding nations (Jordan), and ecological concerns. 
Ibid., 533. 
16Erika Weinthal and Neda Zawahri, “The World Bank and Negotiating the Red Sea and Dead Sea Water 
Conveyance Project,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Global Environmental Policies 14, no.4 
(November 2014): 59. 
17 Erika Weinthal. “The World Bank and Negotiating,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 59. 
18 Ibid., 59. 
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Additionally, after the reform of the World Bank’s procedure to work with Non-
Governmental Organizations, creating an inspection council to review claims of nations 
and bodies affected by World Bank projects in the past, the World Bank quickly jumped 
in to participate.19  
Soon after the commencement of collaboration, and the placement of Vahid 
Alavian to produce research for a feasibility report, the World Bank soon received an 
objection to the project from the Palestinian Authority (PA).20 Finding themselves 
excluded from the project, the PA filed a grievance on grounds of exclusion being that 
the nature of the proposed project is trans-national.21 This objection presented by the 
PA lead to negotiations, and concluded in establishing a Terms of Reference (ToR) 
between the three parties in 2005.22 The ToR first established three goals stated above, 
and additionally commissioned both a Feasibility Study and Environment and Social 
Impact Assessment, known jointly as the “Study Programs”.23 These were to be 
conducted by a Technical Steering Committee (TSC), experts from the PA, Jordan, 
Israel, and the World Bank to undertake these projects.24 Consisting of four 
representatives from each of the three Beneficiary Parties and two World Bank 
representatives, the TSC also called in a multiplicity of regional and international 
experts to ensure accurate preparation for the project.25   
                                                        
19 Ibid., 57. 
20 Ibid., 60. 
21 Ibid., 60. 
22 Ibid., 59. 
23 Ibid., 59 
24 Both of these reports are used in some capacity in this paper. Erika Weinthal. “The World Bank and 
Negotiating,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 60-61. 
25 Alexander McPhail and Stephen Lintner, 2007. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Concept 
Feasibility Study and Environmental and Social Assessment, World Bank. Accessed October 3, 2017, 5. 
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Of note, before the present state of the RSDSWC, this project underwent many 
re-workings of previous canal and water conveyance system proposals before evolving 
into the project it is today. Yet, after the establishment of the Study Program and 
contractors involved, subsequent movements were taken to solidify the logistics of the 
project, including many political configurations.26  In December of 2013, the three 
beneficiary parties involved worked to establish a new agreement outlining the plans of 
the RSDSWC.27 This new agreement includes a desalination plant in Aqaba to provide 
water to Israel, the selling of water by Israel to Palestine –based on a negotiation 
between the two entities – and a pipeline from Aqaba to the Dead Sea to be 
established.28 However, this action sparked controversy and concern, specifically 
among numerous Palestinian ministers, regarding the prospect that Israel will control 
the price of the water, as this can only be established through a negotiation between the 
PA and Israel.29After the establishment of the ToR and the TSC, there was momentum 
to gain funding and begin the process in creating the Study Program. Starting up a 
multi-donor trust fund, the World Bank accumulated donations from a multiplicity of 
countries to fund the projected $16 million cost to conduct the Study Program.30 The 
World Bank also restructured the TSC in order to include a Panel of Experts, comprised 
of ten members, appointed in 2009, which aid in specific research within the complexity 
of the Study Program reports.31  
                                                        
26 Hussam Hussein, “Politics of the Dead Sea,” 533. 
27 Ibid., 533. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Countries listed at the end of “Actors Involved” sub-section. Ibid., 3. 
31 Ibid., 3. 
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Actors Involved 
Within the RSDSWC, there are three main beneficiary parties involved working 
in coordination with multilateral aid agencies, mainly the World Bank.32 The three main 
beneficiary parties include Jordan, Israel, and the PA, all three of which are involved 
with the World Bank in the creation of Terms of Agreement (ToR) for the proposed 
project. Additionally, there are many consulted international agencies to help create the 
main study reports. A few main agencies include, yet are not limited to, Coyne et 
Bellier, Tractebel, Kema, and Environmental Resource Management.33 Paralleling 
direct actors involved in the management and negotiations of the RSDSWC project, 
numerous bilateral actors have contributed to the funding of components of the Study 
Program, including France, Greece, Italy, Japan, South Korea, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United States.34  
Purpose of Study 
Water conflict throughout the MENA region has been a concern, specifically 
surrounding access to potable water in the region. Jordan, proximately situated next to 
Israel and Palestine, is consistently fraught with decreased water access, due to lowering 
sea levels, access to sustainable water sources, and influxes of refugees and displaced 
persons. The study of the environmental and political effects of water conflict is vast, 
                                                        
32 Coyne et, Bellier, Tractebel Engineering, and KEMA, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility 
Study Main Report, Coyne Et Bellier, 1.1.2. 
33 Ibid. Environmental Resource Management (ERM), BRL, EcoConsult, 2014. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water 
Conveyance Study Environmental and Social Assessment: Final Environmental and Social Assessment 
(ESA) Report- Executive Summary, The World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/5174616-
1416839444345/ESA_ES_Mar_2014_English.pdf  
34Alexander McPhail, 2013. Red Sea-Dead Sea. World Bank, 3. 
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including focuses on hydro politics within the Levant. Scholars, such as Jan Selby 
(2003) and Mark Zeitoun (2008), highlight the multifaceted layers of hydro political 
theory in the MENA region, throughout their works, touching on a multitude of aspects 
within the umbrella of hydro politics.35 While each of their works in hydro politics 
concentrates on politics between and within Israel and Palestine, their works cover a 
unique analysis of water in relation to political functioning and evolution within the 
Levant states, and impacts on the broader political relations in the MENA region and 
internationally.36  
Reports from local stakeholders, mainly NGOs, addressing the water crisis 
within the region also highlight water conflict. B’Tselem, an predominate Israeli NGO 
working in Jerusalem, has conducted a host of reports surrounding the water crisis, 
specifically within occupied territories of Palestine. One of their reports commissioned 
in December 2016 outlines the inherent depletion of water resources due to heightened 
forcible removal of Palestinian populations.37 This report, including numerous other 
reports conducted in the early 2000s, outlines the decreased access to potable water of 
the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza.38 B’Tselem reports a large gap in 
water sources, consumption, and quality between both Palestine and Israel, and points 
                                                        
35 Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the Palestinian-Israeli 
Water Conflict, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2008).  
Jan Selby, Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,  (New 
York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2003). 
36 Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East, (2008). Jan Selby, Power and Politics, (2003). 
37Adam Aloni, Salma a-Deb’I, Yuval Drier Shilo, Michelle Bubis, November 2016, Expel and Exploit: 
The Israeli Practice of Taking over Rural Palestinian Land. B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center 
for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.  
38 Yehezkel Lein, trans. Zvi Shulman, July 2000, Thirsty for a Solution: The Water Crisis in the Occupied 
Territories and its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement. B’Tselem-The Israeli Information Center 
for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.   
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to the lack of water network and discriminatory organizations running the water supply 
as reasons for this divide.39   
The issue of hydro-politics is not new to the region. Yet, the RSDSWC 
highlights an interesting catalyst to change of the stagnation of water access within the 
Levant region never been developed this far. The continuation of reports, studies, and 
pilot tests pointing to the eventual implementation of the RSDSWC, thus pose a unique 
excitement to the future of the region, both socially yet also politically. For this exact 
aspect, the RSDSWC is vital to study. One of the largest proposed water conveyance 
systems in the Levant region, the political relations underlying the creation could point 
to larger understanding of political relations in the future, including sustained 
hegemony. Studying this project opens the door to understanding the current stance on 
factors surrounding trans-national development within the Levant region, and how this 
project might highlight political dynamics and leverages in the future. Additionally, this 
project, as a microcosm of international development and understanding political 
complexities, further stands as insight to current international Western development 
motives.40  
Research Questions 
For the purpose of this study I work to answer two main questions about the 
RSDSWC. 1) How does and will the RSDSWC System alter existing relations between 
                                                        
39 Yehezkel Lein, July 2000, Thirsty for a Solution, B’Tselem, Chapter 5. 
40 The definition of Western I use is from development theorist Philip McMichael. He defines Western 
Development as one based on western-based social science and cultural life, mainly coming from colonial 
empires in Western Europe and the US.  
Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE 
Publications Inc., 2002), 3-5. 
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Jordan, Israel, and Palestine, and the relations with large multi-lateral agencies? 2) How 
will this project fits in the larger aspect of international development and contribute to 
sustainable project development? 
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Chapter 2: Development and Power Theory  
Development theory is a complex and multifaceted area of study, outlining a 
host of stakeholders and market-based analysis to unpack layers of economic, social, 
and political interactions. One prominent development theorist, Philip McMichael, 
highlights how development manifests itself in the neoliberal age.41 Mega projects, such 
as the RSDSWC, of large international significance, can be understood through this 
framework. Yet, to further unpack development projects, it is vital to understand the 
nuances involved in implementation and construction of the projects to understand their 
potential impacts. Here, I use a power analysis framework, aiming to explore and 
interpret how power works through implementation of large-scale development 
projects, to better understand the overall societal and environmental impacts that the 
RSDSWC could have. 
Development in the Neoliberal Age 
Philip McMichael frames post-2015 development ideas and projects as ones 
rooted in Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), evolving from outdated Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).42 SDGs, though under a new guise of modern 
development, pose similar framework of creation, focused around state implementation 
and “depeasentization”.43  McMichael argues that in the neoliberal age, development 
takes form as projects, global focuses and concerns driving “implementation and 
                                                        
41 McMichael defines neoliberal as “a philosophy positing an individual instinct for economic self-
interest, justifying elevation of market principles as the organizing principle of society, where private 
interest trumps the public good”. Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change, 373. 
42 Philip McMichael, Kathleen Sexsmith. “Formulating the SDGs: Reproducing or Reimagining State-
Centered Development?”, Globalizations 12, no. 4 (2015). 
43 Philip McMichael, “Formulating the SDGs”, Globalizations, 582. 
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planning of the development project”.44 Just as in development during the era of MDGs, 
development goals are state centric in the implementation process, inherently deepening 
the unequal relationships of the Global North and South.45  
Furthering his analysis of new age development, McMichael states that in the 
implementation of SDGs, many of the new age development projects are a 
commodification of ecological issues through market solutions.46 McMichael states that 
the focus of the Global North development projects center on sustainable development, 
back tracking from the environmental damage from mass industrialization in the 
Globalization era of the 1940s-1970s.47 Yet, development projects, such as carbon cap 
and trade, shift the framework of global ecology focus to that of security for the Global 
North, and ultimately produces more drastic environmental impacts of green house 
gases (GHG).48 McMichael argues that with market development engrained within 
development agencies, the neoliberal development projects are ultimately encapsulated 
in a paradigm that externalizes environmental concerns.49 Critiquing this pattern of 
neoliberal development, McMichael points out that concentration on sustainable 
development subjugates ecology to an economic value, enhancing the uneven patterns 
of development, with emphasis on state control perpetuating state competition, leading 
to government legitimacy.50  
                                                        
44 Global North refers to Western countries stated before. Global South is defined as McMichael as least 
developed countries. Ibid., 585. 
45 Ibid., 583. 
46 Philip McMichael, “Contemporary Contradictions of the Global Development Project: geopolitics, 
global ecology and the ‘development climate’,” Third World Quarterly 30, no.1 (2009): 247. 
47 Ibid.,14. 
48 Philip McMichael, “Contemporary Contradictions,” Third World Quarterly, 248. 
49 Ibid., 258. 
50 Ibid,. 258-259. 
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McMichael is one of many development theorists and his works highlight 
aspects to neoliberal development and implementation on the international scale. His 
works are important to consider to better understand development as projects, and the 
engrained concentrations on sustainability and ecology as part of market concentrations. 
While McMichael approaches development from the lens of addressing Global North 
attitudes, it is important to consider how development projects are implemented, and the 
impacts modern projects will truly have on the environment.  
While McMichael clearly defines neoliberalism development, there are other 
theorists that glean insight into the facets of how development works, including power. 
While there is no one clear definition of power and how it works within our 
communities, the core definition of power, one that power dimensional theories work 
off to create, is when subject A exercises power over subject B contrary to B’s 
interests.51 Interests, as Steven Lukes describes, can be subjective interests – someone 
defining their own interests – and real interests, ones interests being based off of false 
consciousness.52 Working off of this foundational understanding of power, theorists 
have produced a multitude of theories surrounding power, ranging from a 1-dimensional 
understanding of power to areas of disciplines of power.53 Each dimension of power, 
working off of each other, establishes a complex lens of power in application. For 
instance, Bachrach and Baratz build off of 1-dimensional power – based on Dahl’s 
analysis of observable conflict –to create the 2-dimensional power, which identifies 
                                                        
51 To clarify the subjects A and B, these subjects can be individuals, groups, or organizations.  
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Second Edition (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 
37. 
52 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 28. 
53 Ibid., 29. 
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more layers to conflict and how interests are affected.54 Most recent theories revolve 
around 3-dimensional power and power outside of the dimensional fold. 
For 3-dimensional power, Steven Lukes describes power as an ongoing 
behavioral analysis that allows for insight into potential issues.55 By folding in potential 
issues, Lukes is able to express an unforeseen aspect of power, being that of latent 
conflict, coming from contradictions between interests of those exercising power and 
the real interests of subjects.56 The disparities in action coming from differences in 
interests exemplifies both direct and indirect mechanisms of controlling, shifting the 
definition of power from one of power over to that of power as a capacity, dispositional 
power.57 This essential coercion thus produces ideological hegemony reinforced 
through dispositional power.58 
Drawing on McMichael’s neoliberal development theory framework, we can 
attempt to understand the RSDSWC in a modern international development setting. 
Through a power analysis of the current political players and their futures within 
RSDSWC, examining the political economy and the environmental impacts within the 
three beneficiary parties, we can gain insight into how power works through 
implementation of this large development project. My intentions through the use of 
these two bodies of theory are similar to that of Yvonne Braun in her analysis of large-
scale dam projects through a development lens. Organized in the frame of 
understanding large-scale development projects, Braun looks into dams as large-scale 
                                                        
54 Ibid., 29.  
55 Ibid., 28. 
56 Ibid., 28. 
57 Ibid., 69-70. 
58 Ibid.,124. 
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projects guised for the purpose of sustainability.59 Yet, in order to do so, Braun analyzes 
how inequalities in gender, class, and race are perpetuated through modern large-scale 
development projects, such as dam building.60 Similar to Braun’s work, I use a power 
lens to analyze how power-based inequalities and ideological hegemony work within 
the implementation of the large-scale development RSDSWC project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
59 Yvonne Braun, “The Reproduction of Inequality: Race, Class, Gender, and the Social Organization of 
Work Sites of Large-Scale Development Projects,” Social Problems 58, no. 2 (May 2011). 
60 Braun, “The Reproduction of Inequality,” 220. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
In order to analyze the impact of the RSDSWC as a development project, I use 
primary source information held within four main reports conducted by stakeholders of 
the project, along with a list of stakeholders. These reports are the sources that I use to 
analyze how power functions within the RSDSWC. For this analysis, I use a 3-
dimensional power lens to understand underlying power relations in the implementation 
of this project, and the potential perpetuation of hegemony through the effects on the 
environment and political economy.  
Power Dimensions in Analysis  
For the purpose of my study of power within the creation and evolution of the 
RSDSWC, I use a 3-dimensional power theory lens. In forgoing the critiques of each 
dimension of power in which to view a case study, 3-dimensional power allows for an 
analysis of latent conflict and hegemony that is more holistic than that of the 1-
dimensional and 2-dimensional forms of power. Additionally, the 3-dimensional focus 
on the establishment of hegemony will be useful in this case study, due to the historical 
components that shed light onto decisions and non-decisions made in the evolution of 
the project. Utilization of larger political lens, such as Michael Foucault’s power net 
lens, while providing an interesting look into the intertwined characteristics of this 
project, would potentially muddle and exacerbate an understanding of the factors within 
the RSDSWC.61  
                                                        
61 Michael Foucault, Power and Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, Colin Gordon ed. 
(New York: Pautheon, 1972-1977), 79-133. 
 
 
18  
The decision to use the 3-dimensional power theory lens to unearth political 
underworking of the RSDSWC is also corroborated by the use of such style in other 
studies of hydro politics and international water projects in the Levant region. Mark 
Zeitoun, in his analysis of power dynamics between Israel and Palestine in regards to 
water and water rights, uses the 3-dimensional lens of power to allow for a focus on 
compliance in hegemony, through compliance producing mechanisms, highlighting 
power associated with water related projects in the region.62 Mainly focusing on 
evolution of historical political relations on water between Israel and Palestine, Zeitoun 
uses the broader 3-dimensional power theory to unpack hegemony within hydro 
politics, ultimately unpacking the presence of compliance producing mechanisms in 
practice.  
Within this example of applied 3-dimensional power, I also utilize the use of 
compliance producing mechanisms in direct application to environmental and political 
economy impacts. The compliance producing mechanisms, as outlined by Zeitoun, 
include the following: 1) Use of Force, 2) Incentives, 3) Normative Agreements, And 4) 
Ideological Hegemony.63 These stages outline the creation of ideological hegemony 
anchored in 3-dimesional view of power. While Zeitoun is one of many scholars on the 
topic of hydro politics within the Levant and broader MENA region, his work in 
utilizing the 3-dimensional power theory due to critiques in the usage of 1-dimensional 
and 2-dimensional, outline a balanced initiative in unpacking case study projects related 
                                                        
62 Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the Palestinian-Israeli 
Water Conflict, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2008), 29-30. 
63 Mark Zeitoun, Power and Water in the Middle East, 31-32. 
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to water in the Levant region.64 Due to the holistic nature of Zeitoun’s analysis, along 
with my research into the dimensions of power, I have decided to adopt the 3-
dimensional power lens, complimented by the usage of compliance producing 
mechanisms.  
Utilizing a 3-dimensional lens of power and compliance producing mechanisms, 
I apply them to reports and stakeholders of the RSDSWC. The four reports I study 
include the Feasibility Study, the Environmental and Social Assessment, Study of 
Alternatives, and the Jordan Red Sea Project (JRSP). While there are Appendices and 
official Public Consultations also commissioned by the World Bank and the three 
beneficiary projects, the content of these extra reports are summarized within the 
extensive three reports listed above. While there are reports and critiques of reports 
undertaken throughout different environmental NGOs and other agencies, this report is 
unique to analyze in order to better understand motives of the one of the main 
stakeholders involved. Through these reports I intend on looking at the presence of 
certain rhetoric and absence of others. In doing so, I am able to assess the presence of 
latent conflict, through the masking of real intentions, and the establishment of 
coercion. While this could easily spin into a rhetorical analysis, my intentions are to 
merely pinpoint discrepancies in the reports and presence of certain aspects rather than 
usage of certain words or phrases. 
In analyzing the reports, I focus on how environmental and political economy 
impacts are addressed. For political economy, I will focus on how pricing of the project 
is addressed and dealt with, along with the impact on tourism, international donors                                                         
64 Ibid., 35. 
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involved, and potential displacement of persons due to this project. For environmental 
impacts, I will focus on environmental concerns creating the mission for the project and 
potential environmental effects, specifically to that of groundwater resources, the Dead 
Sea, and the Red Sea. Focusing on two characteristics of the project, even though 
sometimes overlapping with other aspects, I am able to utilize the 3-dimensional power 
to assess subjects involved with these aspects of the project and intentions behind the 
inclusion or exclusion of information. Further more, in concentrating on two areas of 
the reports, I am able to better assess the presence of ideological hegemony within the 
project and stakeholders involved.  
Paralleling my power analysis of the reports, I consider the stakes of each one of 
the three beneficiary parties and history behind the reports to unearth compliance 
producing mechanisms. In analyzing the creation of the reports, and how actors are 
involved, I am able to unpack covert and overt intentions of their creation and its 
translation to the broader intentions of the RSDSWC. This aspect of my analysis is the 
point in which stakeholders – the three beneficiary parties – will be addressed to 
understand underlying intentions behind presented information. This lens to address real 
interests will be found through assessing who is winning and losing among the 
beneficiary parties regarding political economy and environmental factors, allowing for 
a closer look into the presence of ideological hegemony. 
Limitations 
While my access to primary sources was limited, each source is a vital piece, as 
they are the only official sources that are available on this project. Additionally, these 
sources are the only current sources that include actual research on each of the 
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components of the project, including, but not limited to, the environmental aspects, 
socio-economic factors, and construction logistics. These reports being the sole pieces 
of information on the evolution of the project, with certain numbers of actors involved, 
it is vital to unpack each of them in order to analyze and grasp underlying political 
foundations that are perpetuated in the creation of the RSDSWC. Further research, 
including primary interviews with World Bank leaders or minsters from the beneficiary 
parties, and new sources, may be beneficial to understand current updates regarding the 
project. Yet, currently, it is vital to highlight the importance of these reports as primary 
sources of information, and how actors are involved in the creation of this information.  
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Chapter 4: Case Studies  
The order in which I outline my research of the RSDSWC includes an analysis 
of each of the four reports through the themes of environmental and political economy 
impacts. Below is a brief background of the creation behind each report, organized 
under those commissioned in partnership with the World Bank and those commissioned 
separately. A brief synopsis of the creation of the reports and involved stakeholders 
follows.  
World Bank Commissioned Reports 
There are three main reports commissioned by the World Bank under the Study 
Program, these being the Feasibility Study, the Environmental and Social Assessment, 
and the Study of Alternatives. The first report, and main report, funded and conducted 
by the World Bank Study Program on the creation of the RSDSWC is the Feasibility 
Study. In 2008, Coyne et Bellier, a French agency, won the bid to conduct this study, 
completing its study in 2013.65 The goal of the Feasibility Study is to review and assess 
“technical, economic, financial, environmental, and social dimensions” of the 
RSDSWC.66 Although the final report was projected to be completed 24 months after 
the commissioning of Conye et Bellier, the final report was completed in 2014 with a 
cost of over $16 million.67 This report includes the proposed route in which the 
conveyance system will flow through, logistics on powering the project, location and 
process of desalination plants, and feasibility of the project in upholding and achieving 
                                                        
65 Alexander McPhail, 2010. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance, World Bank. 4. 
66 Alexander McPhail, 2007. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Concept. World Bank. 4. 
67 Ibid., 4. 
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the three main goals stated in the created of the ToR.68 Additionally, this report outlines 
a configuration of components to the project to create the best action plan for 
implementation and long-term success.69 While the main body of the report revolves 
around scientific analysis of components of the project, the report touches on summary 
of data regarding social and environmental impacts of the project, outlining concerns 
within the port on the Red Sea in Aqaba, desalination efforts in Northern parts of 
Jordan, and other impacts on local communities.70 Additionally, this report proposes 
legal and institutional framework for the cooperation of the three beneficiary parties, 
detailing a structure to accommodate all interests of the parties.71 For the purpose of this 
study, I analyze the Study Program Feasibility Project: Draft Final Feasibility Study 
Report Main Report.  
The second main report of the Study Program is the Environmental and Social 
Assessment. Along with the Feasibility Study, this official report solidified its primary 
consulting firm in 2008, granting the bid to Environmental Resource Management 
(ERM) from the UK.72 The purpose of the report established by the ToR is to “review 
and assess environmental and social impacts”, including a Study of Alternatives which 
entails looking at no-action alternative, and a look into short-term and long-term 
impacts and potential for monitoring these impacts.73 The final report was completed by 
the ERM in March of 2014, outlining impacts to all beneficiary parties, specifically 
                                                        
68 Coyne et, Bellier, 2012, Red Sea-Dead Sea Feasibility Project Summary. 
69 Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, 32.0. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. Section 29. 
72Alexander McPhail, 2010. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance, World Bank. 4.  
73 Alexander McPhail, 2007. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Concept. World Bank. 4. 
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concentrating on impacts to land, land reacquisition and resettlement, and the potential 
leakage into ground water resources.74 I intend on focusing on components of the report 
that stand out statistically, yet also the placement of information, to analyze underlying 
and overt intentions of this report.  
Paralleling the two main reports within the Study Program, the World Bank also 
conducted other studies providing specific insight into research of the main reports 
above, one of these being the Study of Alternatives (SoA). The research in this report, 
carried out by three individual consultants appointed in 2009, was commissioned to 
evaluate and compare strategic alternatives to address environmental problems within 
this project.75 The creation of this report came after concerns from Environmental Non-
Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) and industries in the region concerned about the 
environmental impact of the RSDSWC, pushing the World Bank to conduct this 
study.76 Completed in March of 2014, the SoA outlines alternatives to the project 
including no action, different water transfer options (including an option through 
Turkey), and other desalination options.77 Additionally, this report includes a look into 
why the Base Case Plus Scenario in the Feasibility Study is the best option, and any 
other alternatives this project could entail within its logistics.78 
                                                        
74 Environmental Resource Management (ERM), 2014, Red Sea- Dead Sea Environmental and Social 
Assessment. 
75 Alexander McPhail, 2010. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance, World Bank. 4. 
76 Erika Weinthal. “The World Bank and Negotiating,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 66. 
77 John Anthony Allan, Abdallah Husein Malkawi, Yacov Tsur, March 2014. Study of Alternatives: Final 
Report [Executive Summary and Main Report], World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/5174616-1416839444345/SoA-
FINAL_March_2014.pdf.  
78 Alexander McPhail, 2010. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance, World Bank. 4. 
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JRSP 
One report outside of the lens of the World Bank and Study Program is that of 
the JRSP. The JRSP is a separate study commissioned by the Jordanian Government, 
contracting the services of Montgomery Watson Harza (MWH) in 2007.79 Finished in 
2011, this report explains the possibility of a water conveyance system solely within the 
geographical boundary of Jordan, created and maintained by the Jordanian Government 
and an established Public Private Partnership (PPP).80 This project involves similar, if 
not identical, routes for a water conveyance system in Jordan as the RSDSWC, yet 
stresses desalination efforts will be earmarked for use in Jordan first, and then regional 
interests.81The most glaring differences between the JRSP Report and RSDSWC are the 
drastic changes in infrastructure and economically focused development. JRSP stresses 
providing potable water to Jordan and development in urbanized areas along the water 
conveyance route, including real estate and tourism augmentation in Aqaba and South 
Amman.82 
                                                        
79 Erika Weinthal. “The World Bank and Negotiating,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 69. 
80 Government of Jordan, 2011. Jordan Red Sea Project. Government of Jordan, Accessed November 2, 
2017. http://www.waj.gov.jo/sites/ar-
jo/waternews/Documents/WD%2005%20JRSP%20Project%20Summary%20-%20April%202011.pdf.  
81 Government of Jordan, Jordan Red Sea Project. 
82 Ibid., Part I.  
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Chapter 5: Findings 
Within each of the stated reports, I look into the stated and unstated impacts to 
the political economy and environmental impacts. I outline overall themes of impacts 
for each of these areas of focus, and then delve into specific impacts addressed in each 
report. The themes highlighted aid the process of rhetorical analysis and organization of 
the reports to uncover the presence of compliance producing mechanisms and latent 
conflict.  
Environmental Impacts 
Throughout the four reports I explore, there are numerous environmental 
impacts within the geographical areas of the three beneficiary parties that highlight 
potential concerns in the implementation of the RSDSWC. Before delving into each 
report and the specifics of impacts touched on in each study, I list overall themes of 
environmental impacts reported. The main themes of potential environmental impacts 
that are addressed throughout each report include: 
- Impacts to the Red Sea, including potential for depletion of coral reefs and 
aquaculture.  
- Large carbon emissions projected to come from this project, mainly from 
construction and powering components of the project (i.e. desalination 
plants).  
- Impacts to the Dead Sea include gypsum precipitations that will alter the 
visual landscape. 
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- Groundwater leakage from projected pipeline routes carrying salinized water 
that could impact ground water aquifers along the preferred route and 
alternative routes suggested.  
- The “No Action” alternative having the largest stated environmental impact, 
ranked as “Major Significance”.  
Feasibility Study  
The Feasibility Study addresses numerous environmental impacts, each of which 
pertains to the implementation and sustainability of the RSDSWC. An outline of these 
impacts is stated below:  
- Potential environmental impacts to the Red Sea coral reefs and marine life. 
- Changes in the level of salinization of the Dead Sea.  
- Concerns of carbon emissions during the implementation and sustainability 
of the project.  
- Groundwater leakage from pipelines. 
Along with these stated environmental impacts, a notable aspect of this report is the 
inclusion of a ranking system to assess the significance of the environmental impacts. 
Mentioned in Section 23 of the report, this system ranks environmental and other forms 
of impacts on a scale of significance, the definition of significance ranging from “Not 
Significant” to “Major”, the significance of the impact being enough to shut down the 
continuation of the project entirely.83 In this section, which summarizes findings from 
the Environmental and Social Assessment, there are no environmental impacts ranked 
                                                        
83 Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, Section 23.2.4. 
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as “Major” in significance.84 This is notable, given the multifaceted nature of impacts 
that are projected to appear throughout the construction of the project. 
One of the first environmental impact themes the Feasibility Study outlines is 
that of impacts of the RSDSWC to the Red Sea and Dead Sea. In Sections 4.0 and 5.0, 
the Feasibility Study mentions the current states of the Red Sea and Dead Sea, outlining 
concerns and broad impacts of the project.85 In Section 4.0: The Red Sea, the Feasibility 
Report outlines that impacts on pollution are unknown, and no effects are cited for the 
local populations or tourist industry.86 Additionally, the Feasibility Report cites a large 
environmental concern being the potential damage to coral reefs coming from the intake 
site.87 While information does provide for a look into the overall impact of an intake 
site in the Red Sea, it halts with inquiries to be solved with the augmentation of a 
modeling study.88 For the Dead Sea, the report begins with a description of the current 
ecological state and its main geographical features.89 Yet, unlike information of the Red 
Sea, impacts of environmental concerns are only touched on slightly, through the lens 
of tourism and concern for the chemical industry.90 
This report touches on another concern of the RSDSWC, being that of 
environmental impacts pertaining to the production of carbon emissions. As stated in 
Section 22, there are concerns with energy pressures from the logistics of the program 
that will be chosen and how the electricity demand in Jordan, Israel, and the PA might 
                                                        
84 Ibid., Section 23.4. 
85 Ibid., Sections 4.0-5.0. 
86 Ibid., Section 4.6.1, 4.7.2. 
87 Ibid., Section 4.7.5.2. 
88 Ibid., Section 4.11.1. 
89 Ibid., Section 5.2.6-5.2.7. 
90 Ibid., Section 5.10.  
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be reached throughout this project.91 Energy options that are available for this plan 
include hydropower plants, yet also the usage of alternative greener energy, such as 
solar and wind energy sources.92 In prefacing the alternative for cleaner energy, the 
report touches on the Carbon Emissions projected to be emitted in the production of this 
project.93 It is stated that CO2 emissions, with the increase of energy production, will 
increase to 3 million tons by the year 2060.94 With this statement, there is no impact 
stated on any stakeholders, and merely suggested that alternative “cleaner” forms of 
energy be utilized.95 
Another theme of environmental impacts touched on through the Feasibility 
Study is that of hydrogeology concerns, including groundwater leakages. The report 
states impacts on groundwater and leakages, only stating a “Moderate” to “Minor” rank 
of significance, and how the alternative styles of pipelines and desalination plants have 
a worse impact on the environment than the Base Case Plus Scenario concentrated on.96 
One other impact mentioned in this section is that of the potential for leakage to occur 
outside of the pipeline, into groundwater resources, and the potential for disposal of 
hazardous waste, even though measures will be take to mitigate this effect.97 Other 
impacts to the environment of the RSDSWC include effects on soil, air quality, and 
effect on the visual and landscape.98  
                                                        
91 The logistics of the plan that are decided on in this chapter include the Pipeline Option and High Level 
Desalination Plant. Ibid., Section 22.1-22.2. 
92 Ibid., Section 22.4.3. 
93 Ibid., Section 22.4.4. 
94 Ibid., Section 22.4.4. 
95 Ibid., Section 22.4.5. 
96 The Base Case Plus Scenario is pushed as the best alternative throughout this report. Ibid., Section 
23.5.2.2, 23.5.7. 
97 Ibid., 23.6.1.5, 23.6.5. 
98 Ibid., 23.4. 
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Environmental and Social Assessment 
The Environmental and Social Assessment outlines numerous detailed 
environmental impacts pertaining to the implementation and future of the RSDSWC.  
Being the sole assessment conducting research on environmental impacts, many of the 
impacts overlap those within the Feasibility Study and the SoA. The main themes of 
environmental impacts highlighted in this report are outlined below: 
- Regional impacts in augmentation of potable water and carbon emissions 
- Environmental concerns for the both the Red Sea and Dead Sea.  
- Hydrogeology concerns. 
The Environmental and Social Assessment also utilizes the same significance 
evaluation system as that in the Feasibility Study, ranking impacts from temporal, 
routine, non-routine, and induced impacts.99 The significance of these impacts is then 
ranked, from critical to slight/none.100 The agreed upon definition of major significance 
utilized is an impact to be reported to the Environmental and Social Assessment team to 
be taken into account on whether or not the RSDSWC continues.101 Additionally, many 
mitigation efforts are given with significance rankings, these coming from the 
“Environmental and Social Management Plan” (ESMP).102 As stated in this assessment, 
                                                        
99 Environmental Resource Management (ERM), 2014, Red Sea- Dead Sea Environmental and Social 
Assessment, 9. 
100 Critical significance states an impact that would be so severe and unacceptable that mitigation would 
likely not change the impact. The ranking then labels the next largest impact being “Major impact”, then 
to “Moderate Impact” then to “Slight/None” impact, being temporary, low magnitude, and of little 
concern to stakeholders. Ibid., 9.  
101 Ibid., 9. 
102 Ibid., 52. 
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the ESMP will be the regulator of this project until the beneficiary parties involved 
come up with a governing structure.103 
Regional environmental impacts are one of the largest impacts this assessment 
addresses regarding the RSDSWC.104 Within the report, broad regional impacts are 
assessed throughout the Regional Impact Assessment, outlining regional environmental 
impacts within the water resources demand, energy demand, and climate change.105 
Within the realm of water resources demand, this assessment outlines the RSDSWC 
helps the water demand of the countries within the region, helping alleviate water stress 
on all three beneficiary parties until projected 2060.106 Additionally, in the section of 
“Energy Demand and Climate Change”, it is stated augmentation of carbon emissions 
will increase but will not be permanent or irreversible.107  
Paralleling broad regional impacts addressed, this report outlines specific 
geographical areas exposed to potential impacts, mainly being that of the Dead Sea and 
the Red Sea. Within the Dead Sea section, one of the cited impacts will be that of the 
augmentation of gypsum precipitation that could change the visuals of the Dead Sea.108 
Yet, the assessment quelled concerns of a major impact, as the mitigation efforts, 
undertaken by the assessment team, and phased construction, would allow for this 
potential impact to be mitigated.109 Overall, the environmental impacts to the Dead Sea 
due to the implementation of RSDSWC are ranked at “moderate level”.110 For the Red                                                         
103 Ibid., 53. 
104 Ibid., 14-21. 
105 Ibid., 14-21. 
106 Ibid., 18. 
107 Ibid., 18. 
108 Ibid., 23-24. 
109 Ibid., 24. 
110 Ibid., 25. 
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Sea, the main projected environmental impacts include construction, destruction of 
marine life habitats, and water abstraction affecting coral populations.111 While each of 
these impacts was mentioned, they are each ranked at “Slight/None” significance, after 
mitigation efforts.112 
Other areas of environmental concern addressed in this assessment include 
hydrogeology concerns, including surface water impacts and potential major hazards.113 
Hydrology and flood risks are key water issues pertaining to surface water, and include 
seawater contamination of aquifers and impacts on wadi flood pathways.114 None of 
these were stated to be above a “Slight/None” impact.115 In regards to hydrogeology, 
the impacts of importance to concentrate on are mixing of water and catastrophic failure 
of seawater conveyance.116 These impacts were ranked no higher than “Moderate” 
significance, including mitigation efforts, and the assessment states that the elimination 
of all risk would likely incur “costs disproportionate to the value of the resource”.117 
The “Major hazards”, specifically environmental hazards, which are cited in this report, 
are that of intentional external impact, natural disasters, and issues related to the failure 
of the construction of the conveyance system.118 These risks, similar to potential 
environmental impacts stated in previous sections, do not rank higher than “moderate” 
significance.119 
                                                        
111 Ibid., 26. 
112 Ibid., 26. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 28. 
115 Ibid., 28. 
116 Ibid., 37. 
117 Ibid., Table ES.11, 38. 
118 Ibid., 41. 
119 Ibid., 41. 
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In conjunction to the environmental impacts stated in the case of implementation 
of the RSDSWC, the report additionally outlines environmental impacts within 
alternative routes proposed in the SoA.120A summary for each alternative and their 
respective rankings of significance are outlined in Table ES.16 of the assessment.121 
While some of these projects ranked from “Major” to “Moderate” significance, it is 
interesting to note alternatives, such as restoring the Jordan Aquifer, is ranked as 
“Positive” significance.122 
SoA 
 Within the SoA, numerous new environmental impacts are stated due to 
alternative proposed routes, coupling that of reiterated environmental concerns. A few 
main themes of environmental impacts addressed include:  
- Drastic environmental impacts from “No Action” plan.  
- Various environmental impacts on proposed alternative routes, including 
water allocation from Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea Dead Sea 
Alternative. 
- Concerns of groundwater salinization due to leakages. 
Numerous environmental impacts are explored in outlining alternative proposed 
routes, including a critique at each alternative water conveyance point or desalination 
plant. Before mentioning the alternatives and environmental impacts stated, this report 
outlines impacts within principal findings of alternatives already explored.123 
                                                        
120 Ibid., 45. 
121 Ibid., 48-51. 
122 Ibid., 50. 
123 John Anthony Allan, March 2014. Study of Alternatives: Final Report, World Bank., xx. 
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Explaining No Action, RSDSWC, and Lower Jordan options, this report states that the 
best environmental impact would be from the Lower Jordan option, claiming the No 
Action option to be one of disastrous environmental effects.124 This study additionally 
outlines the possibility of using recycled and excess water to alleviate concerns around 
current potable water access.125 
This report also outlines environmental impacts for other alternative water 
transfer methods, including transfer of the Mediterranean Sea Water to the Dead Sea, 
from Turkey by Land Pipeline, and transfers from the Euphrates River.126 Regardless of 
the feasibility of these stated alternatives, the report only details potential environmental 
impacts broadly throughout these alternatives, only heavily touching on the 
consideration of mixing of water.127 For the alternative locations of desalination plants 
proposed, similar broad conclusions are made regarding the environmental impact.128 
One such impact includes environmental risks when transferring over brine and 
seawater over aquifers in Northern Israel.129  
Throughout the SoA, areas of research touch on broader environmental impacts 
of the above stated alternatives, or combinations of alternatives. Stated mainly in the 
“Comparison Review of Alternatives”, greater concentration is placed on impact on 
water quality, salinization of ground water.130 This section outlines health risks 
associated with the construction of any of the alternatives of RSDSWC, including 
                                                        
124 Ibid., xx-xxiii. 
125 Ibid., xxiii. 
126 Ibid., xxv-xxvi. 
127 Ibid., xxv. 
128 Ibid., xxix. 
129 Ibid., xxix. 
130 Ibid., xlii.  
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disturbances and management of workers to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS.131 More 
holistically, this report contains a table of alternatives and significance rankings of the 
environmental impacts each would have.132 This table is the one presented in the 
Environmental and Social Assessment, with the same significance ranking systems. 
JRSP 
Throughout the JRSP commissioned by the Government of Jordan, there are no 
explicit statements surrounding environmental impacts. While environmental issues are 
seemingly not taken into consideration for this report, there are themes present that 
circle around these impacts, including:  
- The leakage of salinized water from pipelines  
- Potential environmental concerns during the proposed large-scale 
development projects.   
Areas in which environmental problems could potentially arise are in the 
mentioning of potential salt-water discharge from pipelines and canals being a hazard 
for the local environment.133 Stated in Part II and throughout Part IV of the report, these 
concerns arise from placement of the pipeline in Jordanian territory and the increase in 
areas of discharge throughout the country.134 While not explicitly stated, monetary 
allocations for mitigation efforts mentioned in Part III highlight underlying anxiety 
around the potential for environmental impacts of the JRSP implementation.135 
                                                        
131 Ibid., xliii-xliv. 
132 Ibid., xliv-xlv. 
133 Government of Jordan, April 2011, Jordan Red Sea Project, Government of Jordan. 
http://www.jva.gov.jo/sites/en-us/RSDS/SiteAssets/JRSP%20stidies.aspx?PageView=Shared,, II-5-II-9. 
134 Ibid., II and IV. 
135 Ibid., Part III. 
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Paralleling these obscure concerns regarding environmental impact, less 
concentration of these impacts are also portrayed in stated impacts to large development 
plans. Plans including new cities, pieces of water infrastructure, and energy sources are 
cited to be implemented in conjunction with the JRSP throughout Jordan,136 Part II 
outlines the bulk of these development projects, stating proposed plans of infrastructure 
and environmental development.137 Yet, similar to ground water salinization concerns, 
this report simultaneously fails to explicitly state any environmental concerns in the 
areas of development. 
Political Economy Impacts 
Within each of their reports, there also is a host of information regarding 
political economic impacts initiated by the RSDSWC. Political economic impacts 
highlighted in these reports include impacts on tourism, finances, displacement of 
persons, and organizational structure of the RSDSWC or JRSP project. The themes of 
impacts throughout the four reports under the subject of political economy are as 
follows: 
- Regional impacts within the geographical land of the beneficiary parties 
involved, including financial impacts to the parties, infrastructure, and 
potential land acquisition.  
- Financial impacts of the overall RSDSWC proposed and financial impacts 
for the JRSP project.  
- Impacts to tourism and chemical industries throughout Jordan and Israel.  
                                                        
136 Ibid., Part III. 
137 Ibid., Part III. 
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- Political and organizational configuration of the sustainability of the project 
and actors involved within frameworks.  
Each report details facets of these main themes of impacts to the political economy, 
outlining specific impacts pertaining to the broader aspect of the RSDSWC or proposed 
JRSP projects.  
Feasibility Study 
Throughout the Feasibility Study, there are many sections that touch on the 
aspects of political economy and economically based impacts of the project. While each 
of the sections touches on economic impacts in some capacity, I will be focusing on 
discrepancies within sections that highlight concerns with political economy. Main 
themes of impacts within the report include: 
- Tourism and industry impacts for all beneficiary parties.  
- Regional impacts on each beneficiary party, these including the economic 
gain and cost for each party, and investments into infrastructure. 
- Access to potable water. 
- Political configuration of the RSDSWC and the production and pricing of 
peace relations.  
Corroborating discrepancies within individual sections, I also exemplify the lack of 
certain information as insight into the power dynamics within this report.  
One of the first themes that touch on political economic impacts of the 
RSDSWC is that of the impacts to tourism and the chemical industry. The Feasibility 
Report first mentions these impacts in outlining impacts to the Red Sea and Dead Sea. 
Regarding the Red Sea, the report does not highlight any large social or economic 
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impacts, as the main impact would be of effects to the chemical industry.138 For the 
Dead Sea, the report claims that the augmentation of the RSDSWC will help alleviate 
concerns about the decline in the tourism industry in this area.139 The report cites a 
multiplicity of times the economic impact of the No Project option and how that will 
produce net damage costs to infrastructure.140Additionally, although there is no data to 
back the claim that the tourism industry is dying due to the decreased level in the Dead 
Sea, the report states there would potentially be less domestic tourism to the Dead 
Sea.141 Simultaneously, the report states this project will include effects on the chemical 
industry in the Dead Sea.142 The report outlines how the main impact to the industry 
will be from environmentalists, NGOs, and the public working to shut down chemical 
industries in the area in the case the RSDSWC go through.143 Overall, this report 
highlights the impacts to the chemical and tourists industries through a financial lens, 
laying out the economic impacts on tourism and chemical industries, such as Dead Sea 
Works (DSW) and Arab Potash Company (APC), based on the net costs for the 
RSDSWC.144 
Paralleling impacts to the tourism and chemical industries within the two Seas, 
other political economic impacts addressed are those of regional impacts for each 
beneficiary party. The majority of the impacts ranking only minor to moderate 
significance, there is an implicit stance that the project will continue, despite future 
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research into certain aspects of concern, including the social impact of resettlement. 
Additionally, the ranked significances of options for parts of the project, none being 
over moderate significance, even with concerns for community health and safety shifts, 
affirm the overt intentions of the creators of this report.145 
 For Jordan, the impacts of the RSDSWC are viewed from changes to the 
baseline economic state, this being the tourism industry in Aqaba, lack of agricultural 
infrastructure, and Freshwater Zones.146 The noted “Possible Changes to Baseline” in 
Jordan is decline in the agricultural industry, and specifies areas of development of the 
local communities that will ultimately rely on investment in the private sector.147 The 
stated socio economic impacts of Jordan include potential acquisition of land (that will 
be outlined in a “Resettlement Action Plan”) that is only ranked at Moderate 
Significance.148 Additionally, this report outlines financial impacts of the RSDSWC, 
outlining social financial impacts for the project, cost of unit of water and projected 
benefits to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Jordan.149 Corroborating an inherent 
urgency behind the implementation of the RSDSWC, the report also states impacts to 
Jordan in the case that the project does not unfold, including a large deficit in potable 
water resources and changes in infrastructure longevity.150   
Regional impacts to the beneficiary party Israel within the augmentation of the 
RSDSWC include potential changes to the baselines that include new settlements to be                                                         
145 Ibid., Section 23.6.6. 
146 Ibid., Section 23.3.5. 
147 Ibid., Section 23.3.8.1-23.3.8.2.  
148 The “Resettlement Action Plan” is currently still incomplete. Additionally, the ranking of significance 
follows that of the table associated with the environmental section stated in the Appendix. Ibid., Section 
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149 Ibid., Section 28.0. 
150 Ibid., Section 7.4.1, 7.7. 
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established in the Arava Valley and increase in tourism.151 Israel is said to face large 
visual impacts in Masada and potential political activism backlash, both ranked at 
moderate significance.152 The report, unlike the section pertaining to the socio-
economic impacts of Jordan, then suggests means in which to communicate the urgency 
and reason of the project in order to mitigate political activism effects.153 Additionally, 
the financial impact to Israel is outlined as a potential increase in the GDP projected by 
the IMF, and costs of water projections.154 Similarly to regional impacts to Jordan, the 
report also highlights impacts if the project does not take place, impacts to Israel being 
the lack of development within geographical areas in the state’s jurisdiction and lack of 
development of the tourism industry.155 
One last regional impact explored is that of the third beneficiary party the PA. 
For the PA, the baseline report outlines population sizes, mainly in the city of Jericho, 
and freshwater routes.156 Unlike both the sections of changes to the baseline for Israel 
and Jordan, the changes for the PA are relatively short, recognizing the lack of financial 
stability of the PA and how this will affect development in both West Bank and Gaza, 
stressing the importance of political stability to mitigate the instability.157 Additionally, 
the socio-economic impact section for the PA is relatively short; claiming acquisition of 
land is likely, as are effects on tourism, agriculture and industry, all ranked at moderate 
significance.158 Yet in the case of an acceleration in the tourism industry, it is also stated                                                         
151 Ibid., Section 23.3.8.4.  
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the consideration of development of land to be used along the Dead Sea, yet claiming 
potential development in Palestine will be contingent in the event of the creation of a 
Palestinian state.159 Thus, exact projections of effects on the GDP of the PA by the IMF 
are unknown yet revolve around these areas of focus.160 Paralleling those of the profiles 
of the two other beneficiary parties, the report outlines the impacts to the PA in the case 
of No Project option.161 The stated impacts on the PA would be unknown, as 
development of their industries (tourism, agriculture, and population size) would be 
dependent on the “peace process”.162 
Another political economy impact theme heavily considered throughout the 
Feasibility Study is access to potable water. The report first explains the demand for 
each beneficiary party involved.163 Within this demand, the report then states the 
allocation to each of the beneficiary parties, many discrepancies occurring between the 
need versus the allocated amount of water to each of the beneficiary parties. The 
allocation in Jordan is based on stated priorities, the first being human consumption, 
second being industry, and the third being agriculture.164 For Israel, the report states that 
they did not yearn to have potable water from this project.165 The report then touches on 
allocation to the PA, the amount not being based on need, rather matching the amount 
given to Israel, the amount being negotiated between the Beneficiary parties at a later 
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date.166 Throughout this allocation, the price per unit of water is heavily concentrated 
on, both in its pre-salinized state and as potable water.167 
One last main theme under political economy impacts stated in the Feasibility 
Study includes that of the organizational configuration of the project and production of 
peace. In the process of implementing the project, the ToR outlines the roles of 
stakeholders in creating a sustainable organizational structure and framework for the 
project.168 Based on UN Convention Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, the report establishes three options for governing structure of the 
project.169 The first option gives all authority over the construction of the project and 
sustainability of the project to the Jordanian Government.170 The second option outlines 
an establishment of a multi-national commission, with set voting procedures to include 
the voices of all beneficiary parties involved in the project.171 Option three is to have 
the World Bank watch over the evolution of the project, producing a tiered system of 
management.172 Within these options, there are interesting aspects considered by the 
report, including the establishment of the Dead Sea as a World Heritage site (thus 
changing oversight), and the potential establishment of an independent corporation to be 
based in Jordan and to balance the finances of the project.173 Another concept 
mentioned is the creation of a representative political body independent yet comprised 
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of the beneficiary nations, including a public relations section that would work on 
transparency with the public.174  
This information, though vast in possibilities of organizational structure, also 
poses unique insight into intentions of the project. Not only is the presence of these 
governing structure configurations interesting, yet the shifts of the focus to one of the 
options this report deems is best, poses some queries of underlying intentions.175 
Furthermore, the creation of examples from comparisons to political and institutional 
structures to that of American systems is notable. In comparing the potential for a 
separate governing structure, Section 29 outlines its comparisons to that of the Port 
Authority of the Eastern Coast of the United States.176 While this comparison is 
somewhat apt, comparisons to Western style governmental structures, that include state 
regulation, and other international examples, highlights an interesting component to 
potential underlying motives of the establishment of this recommendation of the 
report.177 
In conjunction with producing governing structures, this report also outlines the 
potential for peace the RSDSWC could create. The beginning of the Feasibility Study 
prefaces the implementation of the RSDSWC by stating forgone opportunities of peace 
and political relations if the No Project option occurs.178 These opportunities include 
forgoing an “iconic example” of the “benefits of peace and co-operation”, and forgoing 
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induced development coming from the RSDSWC, such as “water based theme parks 
and aquaculture”.179 The report then continues to unearth the financial impact of these 
opportunities, producing a calculation of prices of “intangibles”.180 Based on the 
Contingent Valuation Study, “intangibles” are subjects calculated at commodity value 
on a subject that wouldn’t otherwise have a price, the most bizarre price point of $41.6 
million being given to “prospects of peaceful co-operation between the Parties in the 
Project”.181  
The pricing of peace continues into the Feasibility Study’s analysis of how 
might the RSDSWC bring peace. Within the ToR’s attempts to address the potential 
peace dividend, adding peace to the region is only a subjective potential.182 The report 
analyzes peace from a political theory analysis, stating the lens in which to view this 
project and how their consulted peace theorist, Eric Abitbol, utilized these aspects to 
better understand the framing of the project.183 After conducting 32 interviews from 
individuals from each beneficiary party, the report states that Abitbol found the project 
is not viewed to bring peace necessarily, rather uphold the co-existence many persons 
view between the three main beneficiary parties.184 The “value of peace” is then 
evaluated, calculating how much peace could bring financially to the region.185  The 
report also states how the benefits to peace are clear, and that whatever structure is 
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decided on to uphold the sustainability of the project, must comply with international 
law and the Oslo Accords.186 
The fact that the Feasibility Study outlines the aspect of peace within the 
implementation of the RSDSWC, with the calculation of peace as a financial point, 
seems deceiving. The implicit expectation that there is an intention to measure peace 
through finances pin points interesting motives of not only creators of the report, yet 
also the presence of the Feasibility Study in establishing the jumping block for the 
RSDSWC.  
Environmental and Social Assessment  
Throughout the Environmental and Social Assessment, there are many themes 
of impacts falling under the larger understanding of political economy impacts. While 
much of the information is similar to the Feasibility Study, specifically in regards to 
utilization of the significance ranking system, many impacts are engrained in broader 
political economic concerns. The main themes of political economy impacts stated in 
the Environmental and Social Assessment are: 
- Establishment of a governing body overseeing the mitigation of social 
factors.  
- Regional impacts to each of the beneficiary parties, including social life 
impacts, land acquisition, and GDP.  
One of the many components of this assessment that delves into impacts of 
political economy is the process of establishing a governing body oversight. This 
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includes the establishment of the ESMP and consultations used to establish research. In 
establishing this assessment, the Public Consultation and Communication Plan (PCCP) 
was established, developing stakeholder consultations undertaken by beneficiary parties 
and members of the Feasibility Study Team.187 Spread out into three main time frames 
(entitled “phases”), throughout each of the beneficiary party’s territory, these 
consultations took place to highlight public concerns of RSDSWC.188 Results included 
concern over the mixing of the two waters, establishment of riparian rights, and delay in 
conducting studies.189 In addition to establishing consultations in the creation of this 
assessment, as mentioned above, ESMP was established in order to provide an oversight 
body, connecting political, design, and mitigation efforts.190 ESMP is also responsible 
for ensuring the consideration of indigenous peoples within the development and 
implementation of the project.191 
In addition to context on political structure of the assessment, this report also 
delves into the theme of regional impacts projected from the implementation of the 
RSDSWC. The assessment firstly touches on how the RSDSWC would potentially 
increase the GDP of all three beneficiary parties involved, as projected by the IMF.192 
Specifically, this project is said to bring about positive impacts on the tourism industry, 
in addition to potential development of the Wadi Araba areas.193 The assessment 
                                                        
187 Environmental Resource Management (ERM), 2014, Red Sea- Dead Sea Environmental and Social 
Assessment,, 13.  
188 Ibid., 13-14. 
189 Ibid., 13. 
190 Ibid., 52. 
191 Ibid., 35. 
192 Ibid., 15. 
193 Ibid., 15. 
 
 
47  
outlines social impacts and land acquisition possibilities regionally. 194 The assessment 
states concerns from the conducted consultations, and stresses, that while valid, many of 
the environmental concerns will be mitigated.195 One of these concerns was the 
contamination of salt water into underground aquifers, which the assessment promptly 
addressed as an item already being mitigated by the contractors of the report.196 In the 
section “Land Acquisition and Resettlement”, it is stated that the majority of the land 
being acquiesced is rural, and almost no direct resettlement of people will need to 
occur.197 Yet, in the case this does occur, the assessment group will create a 
Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) and include provisions for those who lost their 
livelihoods.198  
Paralleling environmental impacts, this assessment also includes a ranking of 
significance in social impacts in a study of alternatives.199 Outlined next to 
environmental impacts, the table in which the significance of impacts is stated, the 
social impacts range from “Positive” to “Moderate”.200 Many of the positive 
significance impacts include relations with other nations, water desalination efforts, and 
chemical industry changes.201 
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SoA 
Throughout the SoA, many political economy impacts are also mentioned in the 
implementation of certain routes. While much of this report focuses on political 
economic impacts to alternative routes not being officially implemented, an 
understanding of similar concerns will shed insight into broader political economic 
concerns of RSDSWC. The main themes regarding political economy impacts of the 
RSDSWC and other proposed routes include: 
- Economic and social feasibility of alternative plans. 
- Comparisons of the overall social and economic impact of the proposed 
routes.  
The first mention of economic impact occurs in principle findings of main 
alternatives explored in the Feasibility Study.202 In each the No Action, RSDSWC, and 
Lower Jordan Option, there is high emphasis on the price difference each of these water 
conveyance systems would have, including how much potable water would cost per 
unit.203 Additionally, within the alternative of the Lower Jordan Option, it is mentioned 
that this originally proposed alternative could work to foster better cooperation among 
the beneficiary parties.204 In the consideration of other water transfer options, as well as 
desalination options, this report outlines comparisons in terms of economic value of the 
program and social feasibility. For instance, while the transfer of water from “Turkey 
by Land Pipeline” might be cheaper, this report stresses how this would foster 
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unreliability in production of potable water.205Additionally, efforts to implement 
desalination plants in Israel, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea, pose 
political issues that are said to slow down the project.206 When considering technical 
water conservation options, this report outlines actions that could be taken by the Israel 
government to decrease potable water usage, through implementation of tariffs, and 
modifying crop patterns throughout the three beneficiary parties to decrease potable 
water usage.207 
Another theme of the report includes the comparison and evaluation of 
alternatives under certain criteria.208 One of these criteria involves cooperation among 
the beneficiary parties, and stressed the need for each party to sustain cooperation, a 
shared vision, and common goal of commitment to sustainability and economic 
incentives.209 Another criteria involved addressing involuntary resettlement and land 
acquisition, stating that many of the alternatives are of large concerns due to their routes 
through densely populated areas.210 The impacts here deemed drastic, yet this report 
stressed the need for “specific resettlement and land acquisition plans to be developed” 
with consultation and social assessments.211 Two other criteria include that of stated 
Regional Development and continued use of the Panel of Experts.212 This report states 
that the augmentation of any of the proposed alternatives would support regional 
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development, through tourism and employment opportunities.213 This economic benefit 
is coupled by the suggestion of this report to continue usage of independent Panel of 
Experts, regardless of the plan decided on.214 In continual usage of this Panel, the report 
affirms beneficiary parties would be institutionalizing international good practices, and 
allow for greater benefits for all stakeholders due to the multiplicity of alternatives and 
their impacts.215 
JRSP 
The JRSP, officially considering the implementation of a different plan than the 
RSDSWC, includes many similar yet hyper-versions of the stated political economic 
impacts. The main themes of political economy impacts throughout the JRSP include: 
- Infrastructure and development plans of the JRSP. 
- Political and organizational configuration for the sustainability of the 
project. 
- Financial impact of the plan. 
JRSP touches heavily on the impacts in the realm of political economy. While the 
majority of the report is on this topic, I merely highlight components and general 
themes in order to gain an understanding of the broader political economy effects 
predicted.  
 The majority of the JRSP report centers on developmental plans along the water 
conveyance route, the same route proposed in the RSDSWC.216 The report outlines 
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plans for both desalination plants and hydropower stations along this route, including 
plans of establishing a freshwater pipeline to transport potable water through.217 Other 
development plans include new cities, including a South Amman City, South Dead Sea 
City, and a multiplicity of resorts, water parks, and gated communities.218 These 
grandiose dreams behind this development are sketched throughout numerous 
renderings of resorts, city plans, and gated communities. Within these proposed 
development plans, impacts expected for the nation of Jordan include greater access to 
energy, increase in potable water, and infrastructure. Additionally, there are hopes that 
these projects of development will create new revenue in addition to “developing” 
certain areas within Jordan.219 While visually pleasing, this plan for development of 
architecture, cities, and tourism industry, also serves the stated purpose of gaining 
revenue into the country, and ultimately to JRSP Company.220 As already outlined 
broadly, this section is of pivotal importance to economic impacts in the future of 
Jordan. The pursuit of building new cities, developing tourism industries, and focusing 
on industrialized centers, if implemented, will be substantial for the country.   
Another theme pertaining to political economic impacts stated in the JRSP 
report include political and organizational configuration of the project. The report 
outlines a variety of plans by the Jordanian Government to ensure the completion and 
control over the JRSP. The Jordanian Government is said to create a PPP, a private 
company, to eventually evolve to the JRSP Company, which will oversee all planning, 
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operations, and financial sponsorship of the JRSP.221 The JRSP report then goes on to 
describe the governing structure working in tangent with the Jordanian Government, 
and plans for implementation.222 In addition to setting up this financial institution, not 
only working in tangent with the government, yet setting up a financial basis, this report 
also outlines a plan to pass a JRSP Law in Jordan by 2012 to ensure the functioning of 
this private company within their nation.223 This plan entails the creation of a financial 
institution privatizing the efforts speaks to motives of the creation of the JRSP. The 
economic impacts are incalculable, as this would be a new and potentially economically 
prosperous addition to the Jordanian Government.  
One last political economic theme touched on by the JRSP report is the stated 
financial impact of the plan. The movements of the Jordanian Government and the 
JRSP Company, once established, include accumulating funding for the building and 
sustainability of the JRSP project. Financially, the outlined plan is a projected 30-year 
endeavor, to establish funding for not only the project, but create revenue streams for 
the JRSP Company and allow for investment.224 There are numerous donors and details 
pertaining to specific type of stakeholders to be involved in the initial implementation 
of the JRSP.225 Paralleling donor tracking, this report also outlines the objective of 
JRSP economic development to include “exclusive development and revenue rights”.226    
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While this merely outlines the plan of financing for the establishment and 
ultimate continuation of the JRSP, it is vital to understand the broader implications this 
could have within Jordan. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis  
In analyzing the aforementioned reports, and the actors involved, I unpack 
evidence of environmental and political economic impacts of the proposed RSDSWC, 
and JRSP, to understand how power works within and throughout the project’s 
implementation. The information I discovered relating to both environmental and 
political economic impacts follow themes throughout each of the reports. In following 
these themes, both throughout the individual reports and jointly, I work to understand 
the role of power within this project. By utilizing the 3-dimensional power lens, I 
unearth underlying intentions, latent conflict, and dispositional power present in the 
creation of the RSDSWC, and ultimately unearth compliance producing mechanisms 
being utilized for the establishment of hegemony.  
Environmental Impacts 
Throughout each of the four reports the ways in which environmental impacts 
are addressed differ in each report, pointing to vacillating interests and compliance 
producing mechanisms in this project. Each of the four reports, in descriptions of 
environmental impacts, has common themes, including: 
- Presence of normative agreements through information present on 
environmental impacts, including the ranking of environmental impacts. 
- Presence of latent conflict, mainly through overt concentration on impacts 
rather than mitigation efforts and the viability of the RSDSWC in 
comparison to other projects. 
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Below, I outline areas of how power works through each report to produce ideological 
hegemony within this development project. 
Feasibility Study 
Within the Feasibility Study, there are many points in which environmental 
impacts are addressed. Yet, each of these points is mentioned in a way that presupposed 
the RSDSWC would take effect. In looking at stakeholders and who would win and lose 
from these environmental impacts, it is clear that ultimately impacts to the Red Sea and 
Dead Sea will be large, thus causing concern for all Beneficiary Parties. Additionally, it 
is worth noting the local populations and their stake within these environmental 
impacts. From this report, the consultations that occurred did not directly touch on 
environmental impacts, thus posing potential negative impacts to the local populations 
who were not heavily consulted.  
The Feasibility Study, including environmental impact data from other sources, 
genuinely seems to assess impacts clearly from a scientific lens. Yet the way in which 
this data is present poses an interesting note, as much of the data is coupled with talks of 
economic vitality and effects on social factors within each Beneficiary country, mainly 
that of the tourism industry. As in Section 23, significance of impacts are considered, 
yet an impact may only be ranked at the major significance if it effects the project so 
much that the RSDSWC would have to be shut down.227 This alludes to the potential 
that the stakeholders creating this report, the World Bank and contracted agencies, will 
only consider environmental impacts under project hindering circumstances, and thus 
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not take into large consideration minor environmental impacts when constructing the 
project. This covert interest is again exemplified in the same section when ranking 
environmental impacts that would affect human lives at “Minor” significance, while 
effects to visuals impacts to areas in Israel rank at “Moderate” significance.228 These 
differences in ranking speak to latent conflict in defining significance within these 
reports, highlighting a potential discrepancy in communication.  
While this report does not follow the first few points of compliance producing 
mechanisms, it does highlight a potential for normative agreements. This report, in its 
placement of environmental impacts throughout the report, coupled with rankings of 
significance, implies the project’s evolution as a good aspect to society, and something 
that is already going to happen. These normative agreements utilized in the description 
of environmental impacts thus reinforce a ideological hegemony within this report, that 
this project will continue, even at the expenses outlined.  
Environmental and Social Assessment 
The stated environmental impacts with the Environmental and Social 
Assessment outline similar concerns as those stated within the Feasibility Study, as they 
are reflective of the same report. Yet, the ways in which these are framed vary heavily 
from that of the other studies. Firstly, the presence of this report speaks to the overt 
intentions of the creators of this report to concentrate on environmental impacts and 
research their significance. Whether or not there will be follow through in the creation 
of RSDSWC, this report signifies the concerns of major stakeholders to take into 
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consideration the impacts it will have within the environment. This concentration could 
also portray a normative agreement, as it assumes the implementation of the RSDSWC 
and merely agrees on the ways to address environmental impacts.  
When delving into the specifics of environmental impacts addressed, this report 
exemplifies similar characteristics to how they are portrayed in the Feasibility Study. 
Each of the environmental impacts stated do not rank above “Moderate” in significance, 
major hazards not ranking as “Major” after mitigation efforts. Stressing that none of the 
environmental impacts will be enough to halt the progression of the project, this report 
is implicit in the continuation of the RSDSWC. This action is a clear example of 
normative agreements adding to an enigmatic ideological hegemony attempted to be 
created throughout these reports.  In addition, the presence of testing alternatives, 
having restoration of the Jordan Aquifer ranked as the only “Positive” significance, 
points to a potential covert intention of the project in establishing further trans-national 
collaboration.  
SoA 
The environmental impacts throughout the SoA are similar to impacts exposed 
throughout the Environmental and Social Assessment report. Yet, the presentation of 
the alternatives poses a unique lens into the intentions of stakeholders in the evolution 
of the RSDSWC. Alternatives for desalination plants and water transfer methods, 
spanning across varying transboundary relationships, are dissected, yet much of the 
impacts are only briefly mentioned. Transboundary water transfer methods, including 
Mediterranean Sea Dead Sea Conveyance and land pipelines from Turkey, are only 
briefly mentioned in environmental impact, mainly touching on effects to potable 
 
 
58  
ground water. The lack of focus seems to reveal the focus of the true viability of the 
RSDSWC, implying the reasonable nature and environmentally sound aspects of the 
project’s implementation, a normative agreement.   
Additionally the outline of impacts on larger comparisons, and lack of major 
significances, speaks to the expectation of the effectiveness of the mitigation system. 
While the environmental impacts are addressed, the aspect that this report accounts for 
planned mitigation systems for all alternatives implicitly states a yearn of the project to 
continue in an any capacity. This then begs the question of a the purpose of urgency in 
creating the report, and agency behind the cooperation mechanisms need to be in placed 
between the three main beneficiary parties. 
JRSP 
As stated in the overview of the environmental impacts, the JRSP Report 
includes little to no information on the environmental impacts of the project. This plan, 
shifting from the World Bank’s motives in the creation of a collaborative RSDSWC 
plan, would involve more development, and hypothetically more environmental impact 
through industrialized development. Thus, it is curious as to the omission of these 
impacts. While there may not have been studies conducted, the fact that there are 
detailed plans for water infrastructure, energy implementation, and new cities and no 
research on environmental impacts, except for the projected increase in potable water 
and energy, alludes to the intentions of the Jordanian Government in creation of this 
project.  
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Political Economy Impacts 
In analyzing the four reports for the presence of political economy impacts, it is 
clear the inherent perpetuation of compliance producing mechanisms. Main themes of 
3-dimensional power working throughout these impacts include: 
- Perpetuated normative agreements upholding ideological hegemony of 
Western style development from concentration on financial impact of the 
project and the projected financial gain from “peace”. 
- Latent conflict between the public and main stakeholders (both beneficiary 
parties and multilateral aid agencies) on issues of water allocation and 
displacement concerns.  
- Presence of the JRSP.   
As in the environmental impacts, I outline how power is working through each report 
and insight into greater understanding of ideological hegemony within the RSDSWC. 
Feasibility Study 
The various parts of the Feasibility Study that touch on impacts to the political 
economy outline similar points of inquiry as mentioned above in the environmental 
impact analysis. Many of the points stressed in regards to economic function of this 
project couple with potential negative impacts, both environmental and social, and 
stress and underlying urgency to complete the RSDSWC. In Section 7, this is 
highlighted by the report including a section entitled “Forgone Opportunities”, in which 
opportunities missed from going with the No Action alternative are stated, including a 
stated loss in momentum for development. These interests, explicitly and implicitly, 
stated in this report, highlight motives of development and urgency of the stakeholder’s.  
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These covert and overt interests of the stakeholders creating this report are 
continually stressed throughout the rest of the Feasibility Report in regards to economic 
and political impacts. In addressing potable water economic impact and allocation, this 
report implicitly favors the nation of Israel, as even though it is documented the Israel 
beneficiary party did not want allocation of potable water. This stands in stark contrast 
to the researched need of potable water in Jordan, and the necessity of negotiations 
between beneficiary parties for potable water to the PA. This exemplifies relationships 
between the three beneficiary parties, yet also attitudes towards sustaining these 
relations through the creation of the RSDSWC. The concentration on uplifting Israel 
also continues into Section 23, where visual impacts created by construction of the 
RSDSWC are ranked higher in significance than human impact in Jordan and 
displacement in the PA.229 The concentration on the state of Israel thus stresses 
potential underlying interests of the stakeholders of this report and inclusion of such 
information.  
In regards to political impacts, this report outlines clearly the financial impact to 
be covered by other international stakeholders, and structure for continuance of the 
project. Within the outline of finances, it is notable the inclusion of financial gain due to 
peaceful relation of the RSDSWC, and the economic prosperity it could provide to the 
project. The fact that this report provides a price to peace relations implies the 
intentions of the World Bank and contractors to stress the overall financial gain this 
project would provide. Additionally, by including two sections focusing on peace that 
the RSDSWC would bring and a governing structure to ensure sustainability of peaceful                                                         
229 Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, Section 23.0. 
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relations, this report explicitly points to the goals of collaboration between the three 
beneficiary parties. Yet, in including comparisons to Western style governmental 
structures, and calculation of peace as a financial gain, rather than conducting 
conversations with the public regarding their thoughts on the peace process, the 
Feasibility Report highlights an explicit political and economic expectation with the 
creation of the RSDSWC.  Also contradicting the stated interests of stakeholders, this 
report exemplifies usage of dispositional power and ultimately the establishment of 
normative agreements. The presence of latent conflict contradicting motives contributes 
to larger components of ideological hegemony within the establishment of this project.  
Environmental and Social Assessment 
This Environmental and Social Assessment touches on a host of aspects in 
addressing impacts by the RSDSWC on political economy. In regards to stakeholders, 
this report in including a process for public consultations to hear out grievances, and to 
solidify results, highlights inclusions of a stakeholder left out in the Feasibility Study. 
Coupling enhanced consultation with the beneficiary parties, this inclusion of the 
general public in the report speaks to the recognition by the World Bank of this body of 
stakeholders in the creation of this project, even if only including them in certain 
aspects of the project. In addition, this assessment in including recognition of potential 
displacement and resettlement, including mitigation efforts to ensure there is provisions 
for those displaced, again stresses the recognition of the general public as a stakeholder 
within this project.  
Although equating the general public as stakeholders to the conversation about 
the implementation of RSDSWC or alternatives, this assessment reinforces many of the 
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overt interests expressed in the Feasibility Study, being the driving factor of economic 
prosperity. Detailing the positive economic impacts to come from this project, including 
projects from the IMF, this report reinforces the concentration on the positive economic 
impacts for each of the beneficiary parties. Additionally, in focusing on the positive 
financial impacts, this assessment reinforces the expectation of the RSDSWC to provide 
development to the region, as stressed throughout the development of tourism. These 
overt expectations of development, combined with the concentration on a new 
stakeholders highlight latent conflict, as the expectations for the project differ from the 
real interests of the populations interviewed. Although both agree on the necessity to 
augment potable water to the region, in regards to economic development, there are 
disconnects in concerns, unearthing latent conflict between the World Bank and that of 
the general public.  
SoA 
As outlined in the overview of the report, the impacts addressed in the SoA that 
touch on the field of political economy include aspects of alternative projects. The 
social aspects of each of these alternatives are ranked according to significance, the 
significance ranking being the same procedure of the environmental impacts. Yet, many 
of the rankings do not rank above moderate significance in regards to social 
significance. These rankings, when combined with disregarding of the feasibility of 
alternative project proposals that include establishing new political relations, depicts an 
implicit expectation of the RSDSWC to continue, even with modification and 
mitigation efforts. Erring on establishing normative agreements, with latent conflict of 
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intentions, these broader aspects outline a potential for greater establishment of 
ideological hegemony. 
One aspect of this study that is impactful is that of the stressed continuation of 
the Panel of Experts and emphasis on collaboration. This study stresses the need for 
each beneficiary party to express their own motivations for the project, yet also commit 
to sustainability of the project, stating the inherent yearn for this project to move 
forward. Yet, this study, in promoting a Panel of Experts, is also interesting, as its stated 
purpose would to be in good practices with international good practices. This explicit 
statement to stay within the confines of international law points to the presence of the 
stakeholder of the World Bank in the creation of this report, and the expectations fusing 
into the creation. Thus, in addition to other components of the report, we must take into 
heavy consideration the motives of the World Bank and contracting agencies within this 
report, including their intentions of development within the RSDSWC, and utilization 
of normative agreements to produce ideological hegemony. 
JRSP 
Unlike environmental impacts, the JRSP report outlines a host of impacts of the 
JRSP to the political economy of Jordan and the surrounding countries. Yet, before 
delving into the specifics, it is worth a note of the presence of this report. Since the 
World Bank or other beneficiary parties did not sanction this report, it is interesting the 
movement of Jordan to deviate from the collaborative RSDSWC project in the middle 
of feasibility studies and the creation of the logistics and create their own project. While 
researchers in the field state that Jordan had dealt with the majority of mediation 
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concerns that have arisen from the creation of the RSDSWC,230 the movements to 
create their own project speak volumes to the intentions of the Government of Jordan 
for themselves as a nation, and potentially unmet intentions in the larger RSDSWC 
project.  
 Within the larger report, there are many aspects that help explain the potential 
intentions of Jordan as beneficiary party within the RSDSWC, and on a broader level 
within the region. The creation of large infrastructure, including new cities, tourism 
sites, along with development around the Red Sea and Amman, there are clear 
intentions of the Government of Jordan to develop their nation’s infrastructure and 
economy if given the resources to do so (resources being water and electricity). 
Additionally, the creation of the establishment of their own financing plan, 
contradicting that of the involvement of the World Bank in controlling finances of the 
RSDSWC, speaks to the yearning of Jordan to control their own finances and prosper as 
individually. The latent conflict unearthed through the real intentions of Jordan in the 
JRSP report, contrasting to plans in the RSDSWC, speak to how components of the 
other three main reports are utilizing normative agreements to appeal to a large 
ideological hegemony established. In the case of the RSDSWC, the ideological 
hegemony is the fact that a water conveyance system is necessary within the modern 
age for the region, and the best practice possible would be the implementation of the 
RSDSWC.  
                                                        
230 Erika Weinthal. “The World Bank and Negotiating,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
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Beneficiary Parties 
Paralleling the study of the reports of the RSDSWC, it is vital to understand the 
impact on the three beneficiary parties involved. Within each of these parties, I will 
outline the stakes each has within the political economy and environmental impacts, 
both stated in the report and through other primary sources. Each of these findings, 
while broad, provide context to the larger concerns of the implementation of the project.  
Jordan 
Within Jordan, there are multiplicities of stakes that this country holds in taking 
part in the RSDSWC. As shown throughout these four reports, the largest concern is 
that the pipeline will be running through Jordanian land. With the placement of the 
pipeline on Jordanian land, there are concerns regarding the construction of the pipeline, 
including environmental disruption, displacement and resettlement, and impacts to the 
ports along the Red Sea and Dead Sea.231 As expressed throughout these reports, 
environmental concerns include issues such as gypsum blooms into Dead Sea after 
conveyance efforts, portable water desalination plants, and leakage of salinized water 
into groundwater.232 Additionally, displacement and resettlement to local Jordanian 
populations within Jordan are coupled along with concerns surrounding the 
environmental and tourism industry impacts in the Red Sea and Dead Sea.233  
                                                        
231 Environmental Resource Management (ERM), 2014, Red Sea- Dead Sea Environmental and Social 
Assessment. Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, 
Section 23. 
232 Ibid. Ibid., Section 23.6.0.  
233 Ibid. 
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Paralleling these broader stakes Jordan holds in up keeping the pipeline on 
Jordanian land, Jordan also holds a large financial stake within the implementation of 
the RSDSWC. As stated in the Feasibility Study and implicitly stated in the JRSP, 
Jordan has much to gain from the augmentation of freshwater resources this project 
could supply. As shown in the Jordanian Government’s intentions of creating a 
corporation for profits off of further development of Jordan due to the RSDSWC, and 
the increase in potable water resources to be sold to neighboring countries, it is evident 
that Jordan would prosper greatly from the implementation of this project.234 
Additionally, in the project price of units of water, it is evident that Jordan would 
benefit financially from the augmentation of the potable water produced from this 
pipeline.235  
With these positive stakes in mind, it is also vital to understand the stakes that 
are more contentious that Jordan holds in participating in this project, that being mainly 
of political stakes. While there is a slew of historical analysis, hydro politics research, 
water rights analysis present addressing the relations of Jordan and its neighbors of 
Palestine and Israel, for the scope of this project, I will look at stakes stated in 
negotiations and reports of the Government of Jordan. With the presence of the JRSP, it 
is evident the interest of the Government of Jordan to take control of the political 
workings and sustainability of the RSDSWC. Yet, within the Feasibility Study, there is 
an interesting section outlining a proposed organizational framework for the RSDSWC 
between the three beneficiary parties. In the Feasibility Study Jordan is encouraged to 
                                                        
234 Government of Jordan, 2011, Jordan Red Sea Project, Part III. 
235 Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, Section 28.0.  
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collaborate with the other two beneficiary parties in the creation of the project, and 
work on governance strategies that include oversight of each body.236 While this 
recommendation highlights underlying motives of other stakeholders in the 
implementation of the RSDSWC, this part also outlines potential hindrances on 
Jordan’s right over the project although it is on Jordanian land. Additionally, this report, 
as stated by the ToR, was not supposed to include political analysis or projections 
around the riparian rights of the beneficiary parties.237 Paralleling the wavering concern 
around government, Erika Weinthal points out that Jordan consistently plays the role of 
mediator between the other two beneficiary parties, spurring frustration during 
negotiations with the World Bank.238 The role of negotiation, along with the 
presumptions made regarding organizational structure, speaks to a large stake Jordan 
politically has in the implementation of the RSDSWC. 
Israel 
For Israel, there are many stakes within the implementation of the RSDSWC. 
One of the largest stakes Israel contains revolves around financial gains and impacts. As 
outlined in the reports, Israel could gain significant energy resources from this project, 
including potable water resources.239 Increases to GDP of Israel, including the 
possibility for development after the implementation of the RSDSWC, speak to a large 
financial stake Israel has within the RSDSWC project. Additionally, the potential reboot 
                                                        
236 Ibid., Section 29.0 and 31.0.  
237 Erika Weinthal, “The World Bank and Negotiating the Red Sea and Dead Sea Water Conveyance 
Project,” 64. 
238 Ibid., 63. 
239 Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, Section 22.0. 
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to the tourism industry with the augmentation of water resources to the Dead Sea is a 
positive stake Israel holds.240 
Another larger stake Israel has within the implementation of the RSDSWC is 
that of the declining usage and investment into the chemical industry without the 
RSDSWC. As stated in the Feasibility Study, there are numerous local ENGOs that 
would project the chemical industry declining if the Dead Sea continues to recede.241 
This could cause a large deficit in financial gain that would have been earned with the 
implementation of the RSDSWC. Thus, there are motives to continue the path of 
developing the RSDSWC in order to gain some stability in the industry.  
One last overarching stake that Israel also has in the implementation of the 
RSDSWC includes that of political stakes. While not as large as Jordan, Israel and its 
involvement in the RSDSWC to sell potable water to Palestine, promotes an interesting 
political stake when agreeing to terms of the implementation.242 This aspect of the 
RSDSWC, combined with Israel’s past opportunities to create their own canal from the 
Mediterranean Sea inland, speak to the overall political leverage Israel comes into the 
project with.243 While these are broad points within the history of the political 
involvement of Israel within water projects and riparian rights with one or both of the 
other beneficiaries involved, it highlights a current stakes in project implementation.  
                                                        
240 Ibid.,Section 5. 
241 Ibid., Section 5. 
242 Hussam Hussein, “Politics of the Dead Sea,” 533. 
243 Hussam Hussein, “Politics of the Dead Sea.” 
 
 
69  
The PA 
A majority of the stakes that the PA holds in taking part in the RSDSWC is 
stated within the report’s findings. Many of these stakes revolve around resettlement 
concerns, environmental impacts, and financial gains. Additionally, there are stakes 
regarding the buying of potable water from Israel after desalination takes place, and the 
social and financial impact that might have within the PA.244 Another stake held by the 
PA throughout the consideration and implementation of RSDSWC is development 
potential among the tourism industry and economy.245 Many of these concerns and 
stakes regarding economic development of industries within the PA are outlined in the 
Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute’s critique on the RSDSWC.246 
Yet, as the Feasibility Study outlines, many of these benefits would be 
determined only by the implementation of the peace process and cooperation of all 
beneficiary parties.247 Thus, one of the largest stakes the PA has in the implementation 
of the RSDSWC is that of political configuration and stability. As stated in Chapter 1, 
the PA, after filing a grievance to the World Bank, was finally included in the 
continuation of programming of the RSDSWC after initially not being included in the 
process. This then poses concern with the continuation of the RSDSWC, seeing already 
disputes have arisen between the allocation of potable water to the PA, wording within 
                                                        
244 Ibid., 533-534. 
245 Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, Section 23.3-
23.6.  
246 Dr. Shaddad Attili, Dr. Jad Issac, Dr. Numan Kanafani, The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyer: The 
Project, Assessments and Potential Benefits to Palestinian Authority. Palestinian Authority: Palestine 
Economic Research Institute, March 2013. 
247 Coyne et, Bellier, 2011, Red Sea-Dead Sea Draft Final Feasibility Study Main Report, Section 7.7.4. 
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the ToR, and tumulus negotiations.248 Additionally, when considering of the history of 
riparian rights of the PA, it is important to highlight this stake of the PA in the 
RSDSWC as not new, yet promising in collaboration with the two other beneficiary 
parties. 
Overall Analysis 
Throughout the consideration and analysis of each of the impacts through the 
four reports, it becomes clear the presence of a large body of latent conflict and 
ultimately promotion of ideological hegemony. The presence of such throughout the 
reports deems to be swayed toward to the promotion of the World Bank’s motives and 
inclusion in the creation of the reports. The compliance producing mechanisms used 
throughout these reports, in both environmental and political economy impacts reveal a 
greater concentration on international concerns of peace creation and economic benefit 
of the RSDSWC. With each of the above analyses, the numerous places of compliance 
producing mechanisms and latent conflict allude to the current political state of the 
RSDSWC project and the true motives behind its potential creation. As mentioned 
throughout the analysis above, the intentions, rather than the saving of the Dead Sea, 
seem more oriented toward development, mainly financial and tourism industry 
development. Additionally, the disconnect between the stated intentions of the 
beneficiary parties and that of the World Bank, and subsequently contracted services, 
highlights potential hegemonic powers, which revolve around the international 
community. These aspects, paralleling that of the presence of the JRSP Report, outline 
                                                        
248 Erika Weinthal, “The World Bank and Negotiating the Red Sea and Dead Sea Water Conveyance 
Project,” 55-57. 
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differences in the intentions of the international aid community, mainly economic 
multilateral agencies, in comparison to that of beneficiary parties. Divides in intentions, 
latent conflict, and lack of collaboration present to this day, highlight aspects for the 
future of the RSDSWC.  
In peering into these aspects of power working within the implementation of the 
RSDSWC, it becomes clear that this project follows closely global sustainable 
initiatives not unlike those described by McMichael. By focusing on commodification 
of peace relations, price of water per unit, and emphasis on peace relations, the 
ideological hegemony promoted throughout the implementation of this plan works to 
promote western style development steeped in sustainable themes. Through viewing 
how power works among the environmental and political economy impacts described, it 
becomes clear that large-scale development projects, such as the RSDSWC, are 
designed to reinforce inequitable and profit focused ideological hegemony of power of 
neoliberal development. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
Water, a necessity within our everyday life, is surprisingly complex in its 
societal role. A now sought after token of life in many parts of the world, water is 
becoming more contentious then ever predicted. Throughout my research I explored the 
importance of water within the MENA region and how it translates to development 
projects within the neoliberal age. Specifically, I looked into the augmentation of 
potable water to the region, and the societal and political impacts there are behind the 
influx of resources. 
In this report, I studied the RSDSWC as a large-scale development project, 
attempting to understand the future of this project for the political basis of the region 
and in the larger field of development. I utilized a 3-dimensional power lens to unearth 
ideological hegemony and latent conflict at play in four main reports concerning the 
RSDSWC, the Feasibility Study, Environmental and Social Assessment, the Study of 
Alternatives, and the Jordan Red Sea Program. In each of these reports, I sought 
environmental and political economic impacts, through both rhetoric and information 
present and absence from reports. These findings included similar impacts between 
reports, yet drastically differently impacts for each of the beneficiary parties involved. 
From these findings, I then analyzed the presence of this information, its placement, 
corroborating with background information from stakeholders involved, to understand 
how power plays into the implementation of this project. Utilizing the 3-dimensional 
power lens, I unpacked the presence of latent conflict, conflict of interests, and 
compliance producing mechanisms used throughout this report, all reinforcing a larger 
ideological hegemony.  
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Through this analysis, finding a host of examples of latent conflict and 
compliance producing mechanisms, I unearthed a large presence of ideological 
hegemony within the creation of this project. These aspects then posed an 
understanding on how power can work within implementation of large-scale 
development projects to sustain ideological hegemony power aspects. The ideological 
power present throughout the four reports all pointed to international neoliberal 
development, with a westernized focus. Uplifting commodification of water and 
political motives over stated environmental concerns, the reports all lead to the 
RSDSWC being a large-scale development project perpetuating finance focused 
normalcies of development. More importantly, this study gives us insight into the future 
of large-scale development projects and ways in which multi-lateral aid power is 
perpetuated throughout impacts.  
While this report is one example of many of large-scale development projects 
taking place internationally, my research sheds light onto how we can better understand 
development through a power lens. Through using a power dimensional lens on future 
reports, we could be able to understand better the manifestation of certain actions by 
stakeholders, and unpack the reasons underlying the creation of a project. Yet, there is 
more work to be done to further understand how a power analysis can work to unpack 
development projects in the neoliberal age and aid in understanding the future of 
development. My analysis of the RSDSWC is a microcosm effect of power application 
that will hopefully continue in assessing other large-scale development projects within 
the MENA region.  
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Appendix 1: Table of Reports 
 
Name of 
Report 
 
Official 
Title of 
Report 
 
Date of 
Publicati
on 
 
Person(s)/Organiz
ation Who 
Commissioned 
 
Person(s)/ 
Organizat
ion Who 
Conducte
d 
 
 
Addition
al 
Studies 
In 
Report  
 
The 
Feasibility 
Study 
 
 
Draft Final 
Feasibility 
Study 
Report: 
Main 
Report 
 
 
April 
2011 
 
 
 
World Bank, 
Jordan, Israel, and 
the Palestinian 
Authority 
 
Coyne et 
Bellier, 
Tractebel 
Engineerin
g (Suez), 
KEMA 
 
13 
Appendi
ces 
(found 
on The 
Hashemi
te 
Kingdom 
of 
Jordan’s 
Ministry 
of Water 
and 
Irrigation 
Website)  
 
Environme
ntal And 
Social 
Assessment 
 
Red Sea-
Dead Sea 
Water 
Conveyanc
e Study 
Environme
ntal and 
Social 
Assessment
: Final 
Environme
ntal and 
Social 
Assessment 
(ESA) 
Report 
 
March 
2014 
 
The World Bank 
 
ESA Study 
Consortiu
m: 
Environme
nt 
Resource 
Manageme
nt (ERM), 
BRL 
Ingénierie, 
ECO 
Consult  
 
 
N/A 
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Study of 
Alternative
s (SoA) 
 
Red Sea-
Dead Sea 
Water 
Conveyanc
e Study 
Program: 
Study of 
Alternative
s Final 
Report  
 
 
March 
2014 
 
 
The World Bank 
Professor 
John 
Anthony 
Allan, 
Professor 
Abdallah I. 
Husein 
Malkawi,  
Professor 
Yacov 
Tsur 
 
 
N/A 
 
Jordan Red 
Sea Project 
(JRSP) 
 
Jordan Red 
Sea 
Project: 
Project 
Summary  
 
April 
2011 
 
 
Hashemite 
Kingdom of 
Jordan/Government 
of Jordan 
 
Montgome
ry Watson 
Harza 
(MWH) 
 
 
N/A 
 
Table 1: “Appendix 1: Table of Reports” 
This table details information about each of the reports used throughout this study. Each 
report’s information can be found in their official reports cited in the Bibliography.  
 
  
76  
Bibliography 
 
Abu Qdais, Hani. “Environmental impacts of the mega desalination project: the Red- 
Dead Sea conveyor.” Science Direct no. 220 (2008): 16-23. 
Allan, John Anthony, Abdallah Husein Malkawi, Yacov Tsur. 2014. Study of 
Alternatives: Final Report. World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/517461
6-1416839444345/SoA-FINAL_March_2014.pdf.  
Aloni, Adam, Salma a-Deb’I, Yuval Drier Shilo, Michelle Bubis. November 2016. 
Expel and Exploit: The Israeli Practice of Taking over Rural Palestinian Land. 
B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories.  
Asmar, Basel. “The Science of Politics of the Dead Sea: Red Sea Canal or Pipeline.” 
The Journal of Environment and Development 12, no.3 (September 2003): 325-
339. 
Attili, Dr. Shaddad, Dr. Jad Issac, Dr. Numan Kanafani. The Red Sea-Dead Sea Water 
Conveyer: The Project, Assessments and Potential Benefits to Palestinian 
Authority. Palestinian Authority: Palestine Economic Research Institute, March 
2013. 
Bellier, Coyne-et, Tractebel Engineering, and KEMA. 2012. Red Sea – Dead Sea Water 
Conveyance Study Program Feasibility Project: Draft Final Feasibility Study 
Report Summary. Coyne Et Bellier. Accessed October 3, 2017. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/Feasibili
ty_Study_Report_Summary_EN.pdf  
Bellier, Coyne-et, Tractebel Engineering, and KEMA. April 2011. Red Sea – Dead Sea 
Water Conveyance Study Program Feasibility Study: Draft Final Feasibility 
Study Report Main Report. Coyne Et Bellier. Accessed October 3, 2017.  
Braun, Yvonne. “The Reproduction of Inequality: Race, Class, Gender, and the Social 
Organization of Work Sites of Large-Scale Development Projects.” Social 
Problems 58, no. 2 (May 2011): 218-303.  
El-Anis, Imad, and Roy Smith. “Freshwater Security, Conflict, and Cooperation: The 
Case of the Red Sea – Dead Sea Conduit Project.” Journal of Developing 
Societies 29, no. 2 (2013): 1-22.   
 
 
77  
Environmental Resource Management (ERM), BRL, EcoConsult. 2014. Red Sea-Dead 
Sea Water Converyance Study Environmental and Social Assessment: Final 
Environmental and Social Assessment (ESA) Report- Executive Summary. The 
World Bank. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/517461
6-1416839444345/ESA_ES_Mar_2014_English.pdf. 
Foucault, Michael. Power and Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings. 
Colin Gordon ed. New York: Pautheon, 1972-1977.  
Government of Jordan. 2011. Jordan Red Sea Project. Government of Jordan. 
http://www.waj.gov.jo/sites/ar-
jo/waternews/Documents/WD%2005%20JRSP%20Project%20Summary%20-
%20April%202011.pdf.  
Hussein, Hussam. “Politics of the Dead Sea Canal: a historic review of the evolving 
discourses, interests, and plans.” Water International 42, no. 5 (2017): 527-542. 
Lein, Yehezkel, trans. Zvi Shulman. July 2000. Thirsty for a Solution: The Water Crisis 
in the Occupied Territories and its Resolution in the Final-Status Agreement. 
B’Tselem-The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories.  
Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View. Second Edition. New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005. 
McMichael, Philip. “Contemporary Contradictions of the Global Development Project: 
geopolitics, global ecology and the ‘development climate’.” Third World 
Quarterly 30, no.1 (2009): 247-262. 
McMichael, Philip, Kathleen Sexsmith. “Formulating the SDGs: Reproducing or 
Reimagining State-Centered Development?” Globalizations 12, no. 4 (2015): 
581-596.  
McMichael, Philip. Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective. 5th ed. Los 
Angeles: SAGE Publications Inc., 2002.  
McPhail, Alexander and Stephen Lintner, 2007. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance 
Concept Feasibility Study and Environmental and Social Assessment, World 
Bank. Accessed October 3, 2017. 
McPhail, Alexander, and Stephen Lintner. 2013. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance 
Study Program: Overview. World Bank. Accessed October 3, 2017. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/Overvie
w_RDS_Jan_2013.pdf?resourceurlname=Overview_RDS_Jan_2013.pdf%26 
 
 
78  
McPhail, Alexanderm and Stephen Lintner. 2010. Red Sea-Dead Sea Water 
Conveyance  Study Program: Overview. World Bank. Accessed October 3, 
2017. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTREDSEADEADSEA/Resources/Backgro
und_Note_October_2010.pdf   
Nazzal, Yousef, Marc A Rosen. “Sustainable Development and the Red Sea-Dead Sea 
Canal Project.” Journal of Water Management Modeling (2012): 353-365.  
Quagliarotti, Desireé A.L. “Technical Solutions To Avoid Water Conflicts: The Red 
Sea-Dead Sea Canal Project.” Global Environment 7, no. 2 (2014): 405-441.  
Rist, Gilbert. History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith. 3rd ed. 
New York: Zed Books, 2008. 
Selby, Jan. Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2003.  
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Ministry of Water and Irrigation. “JRSP 
Overview.” Accessed November 3, 2017.  
Wedyan, Moh’d, Ahmed El-oqlah, Khalil Altif, and Khalid Khlifate. “The Dead Sea 
Ecosystem Influenced By Red Sea- Dead Sea Conduit Project (Peace Conduit).” 
Transylvania Review of Systemical and Ecological Research 15, no. 2 (2013): 
45-60. 
Weinthal, Erika, and Neda Zawahri. “The World Bank and Negotiating the Red Sea and 
Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project.” Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Global Environmental Policies 14, no.4 (November 2014): 55-74. 
WorldBank. December 9, 2013, PressRelease: “Senior Israeli,Jordanian and 
 Palestinian Representatives Sign Milestone Water Sharing Agreement.”   
Zeitoun, Mark. Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the 
Palestinian-Israeli Water Conflict. London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2008. 
 
